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ABSTRACT 
Airlines are exposed to risks in swings in the price of jet fuel. While there are many different 
options that they can use to hedge this risk, airlines often underutilize them. This study establishes 
the minimum variance hedge ratio for an airline wishing to hedge with futures, while also 
establishing the best cross-hedging asset. 
Airlines hedging with futures would create the most effective hedge by using 3-month 
maturity contracts of heating oil. 3- Month maturity contracts are slightly more effective as hedging 
tools than the next month, but beyond the 3-Month veil, increased maturity makes heating oil less 
effective as a cross hedging tool.  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I’d like to thank Dr. Siew Hoon Lim, her guidance and patience have been invaluable. I 
would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. William Wilson and Dr. Alan Dybing. Without 
their suggestions and comments this thesis wouldn’t be what it is today. Finally, I would like to 
thank my parents and family for their support. Thanks also goes to the Upper Great Plains 
Transportation Institute for funding both me and this study. 
  
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES .................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF APPENDIX FIGURES ................................................................................................................. xi 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Problem Statement ................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 4 
2.1. Background ............................................................................................................................................. 4 
2.2. Network Industries ................................................................................................................................ 6 
2.3. Introduction to Risk ............................................................................................................................... 9 
2.4. Financial Risk ........................................................................................................................................ 10 
2.5. Market Risks .......................................................................................................................................... 11 
2.6. Value at Risk ......................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.7. Hedging .................................................................................................................................................. 18 
2.8. Financial Instruments .......................................................................................................................... 18 
2.9. Advantages of Hedging ....................................................................................................................... 22 
2.10. Disadvantages of Hedging ................................................................................................................ 28 
vi 
 
2.11. Fuel Hedging and the Airline Industry ........................................................................................... 33 
2.12. Producer Hedging .............................................................................................................................. 40 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ........................................................................................................... 43 
3.1. Models .................................................................................................................................................... 43 
3.2. Measuring Hedge Effectiveness ......................................................................................................... 48 
3.3. Monte Carlo Simulation ...................................................................................................................... 49 
3.4. Value at Risk with Monte Carlo Simulation ..................................................................................... 50 
3.5. Data ........................................................................................................................................................ 51 
4. RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 63 
4.1. Hedge Ratio ........................................................................................................................................... 63 
4.2. Model Results ........................................................................................................................................ 65 
4.3. Measure of Log-Likelihood ................................................................................................................ 70 
4.4. Measure of Hedge Effectiveness ....................................................................................................... 71 
4.5. Monte Carlo Simulation ...................................................................................................................... 73 
4.6. Value at Risk ......................................................................................................................................... 76 
5. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 78 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................ 80 
APPENDIX. MODEL ESTIMATIONS.................................................................................................... 84  
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                                            Page 
2.1. Airlines’ Hedging Practices ..................................................................................................................... 38 
2.2. Average Price per gallon of Jet Fuel ...................................................................................................... 39 
2.3. Fuel Cost as a Percentage of Operating Expense ................................................................................ 40 
3.1. Contract Descriptions .............................................................................................................................. 53 
3.2. Summary Statistics .................................................................................................................................... 54 
3.3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Results ......................................................................................................... 58 
3.4. Phillips-Perron Results............................................................................................................................. 58 
3.5. Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin Results ...................................................................................... 59 
3.6. Cointegration Test Results ...................................................................................................................... 62 
4.1. Hedge Ratio ............................................................................................................................................... 64 
4.2. WTI Covariance Results .......................................................................................................................... 65 
4.3. WTI OLS Results ..................................................................................................................................... 65 
4.4. WTI ECM Results .................................................................................................................................... 66 
4.5. WTI ARCH(1) Results ............................................................................................................................ 67 
4.6. WTI GARCH(1,1) Results ...................................................................................................................... 68 
4.7. WTI ECM-GARCH(1,1) Results ........................................................................................................... 69 
4.8. Results of Hedge Effectiveness .............................................................................................................. 72 
viii 
 
4.9. Monte Carlo Distributions ...................................................................................................................... 73 
4.10. Results of Monte Carlo Hedge Effectiveness .................................................................................... 74 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure                                                                                                                                           Page 
2.1. Comparison of Jet Fuel Price and Crack Spread ................................................................................. 15 
2.2. Airfare Index and Jet Fuel Price ............................................................................................................. 41 
2.3. Operating Profit per Available Seat Mile .............................................................................................. 42 
3.1 Jet Fuel Spot Price with Trend ................................................................................................................ 56 
3.2. Log Difference of Jet Fuel Price ............................................................................................................ 60 
4.1. Log-Likelihood Results for ECM-GARCH Models ........................................................................... 70 
4.2. Hedge Effectiveness by Commodity from the Simulated Results .................................................... 75 
4.3. VaR for Potential Hedge Percentages  .................................................................................................. 77 
x 
 
LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                                            Page 
A.1. Results of the Airfare/Jet Fuel Granger Causality .............................................................................. 84 
A.2. Correlation Matrix for Airfare/Jet Fuel ............................................................................................... 84 
A.3. WTI Test Results ..................................................................................................................................... 85 
A.4. Brent Results ............................................................................................................................................ 88 
A.5. Heating Oil Results ................................................................................................................................. 91 
A.6. Gasoil Results ........................................................................................................................................... 94 
A.7. 95% VaR Numeric Results .................................................................................................................... 97 
A.8. 99% VaR Numeric Results .................................................................................................................... 98 
xi 
 
LIST OF APPENDIX FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                                           Page 
A.1. 99% VaR Results Graph ......................................................................................................................... 98 
 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem Statement 
The total number of air travelers has more than doubled since deregulation of the airline 
industry in 1978 (Smith and Cox, 2008). However, airlines continue to have a difficult time staying 
profitable. The airlines industry is crucial to the American economy, accounting for over 10 million 
jobs and 5.2% of the United States Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009 (FAA, 2011). Yet just 
four years prior to 2009, four major airlines were under Chapter 11 restructuring. The airline 
industry was deregulated in 1978 opening it up to market forces. Post deregulation airlines operate in 
a very competitive market and in the years following 1978 have developed many different ways of 
trying to develop an advantage. Many airlines adapted efficiency increasing measures, others 
developed low cost structures, but profit margins for airlines remained low (Smith and Cox, 2008). 
While airlines are making efforts to increase their profitability, they still face many problems, several 
of which are unique to the industry. 
Airline deregulation did not solve all of the problems for the industry. While there were 
those who feared that without government regulation airlines would adopt monopolistic pricing, it 
worked out that pressure from competition has actually helped out passengers. Real airfares dropped 
25% between 1991 and 2008 (Smith and Cox, 2008) and are 22% lower than they would be if 
airlines were still fully regulated (Morrison and Winston, 2000). These lower airfares have worked 
out as a tremendous advantage for passengers but have not had the same effect on airlines. 
The airline industry confronts many exogenous shocks that cannot be easily addressed. 
These shocks, such as terrorist attacks, political instability, and global diseases have been partly 
responsible for the loss of growth for the entire decade of the 2000s. The post 9/11 shock of 2001 
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decreased demand by 20%, and it would not be until after 2010 that demand would return to pre-
9/11 levels (Borenstein, 2011). Even during periods of decreased demand, airlines often have large 
fixed and sticky costs, meaning that they must continue to operate even with lower load factors and 
reduced revenue per mile (RPM).  
US airlines also face intense competition when pricing their tickets. With the advent of 
websites that can compare multiple airlines’ prices for tickets, ticket prices have been forced even 
more downward. Due to competition, the price premium that airlines are able to charge has fallen 
20% over the past two decades (Borenstein, 2011). While increases in efficiency have improved the 
positions of many airlines, for others breakeven points are still out of reach. These factors have led 
to the consolidation of many airlines (e.g. Continental – United, Northwest – Delta, American 
Airlines – US Airways, etc.) in recent years. While consolidation has helped the industry reach 
breakeven points and better serve economies of scale and density, it has not addressed the 
underlying issue facing airlines, which is the inability to control costs. 
The increased competition has also made it so airlines cannot easily pass on costs to 
consumers.  In conjunction with this, airlines have narrow profit margins implying that airlines have 
restricted cash flows in the event of a price of an input increasing. The combination of these factors 
means that for an airline to succeed it must control costs (Carter et al, 2004). Of airlines’ many costs, 
the two largest single areas of cost are labor and jet fuel. Traditionally, labor has been an airline’s 
greatest cost but jet fuel has gradually replaced labor as the single largest cost. The increase in the 
price of jet fuel has been paired with an increase in the price volatility, meaning that not only have 
the price swings become larger as a percentage, but they have also become larger in both nominal 
and real terms. To protect against these swings some airlines have decided to hedge their jet fuel.  
Additionally, airlines currently use many different methods to reduce fuel usage. Many 
airlines are updating fleets and making modifications to aircraft to increase fuel efficiency. Other 
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airlines have gone as far as replacing the seats, television monitors, and even the beverage carts with 
newer and lighter versions (FAA, 2011). However, these improvements have not been enough for 
airlines to remain profitable during times of increased jet fuel costs. Because of this, fuel hedging 
and financial contracts play an important role in fuel cost and risk management. These financial 
instruments, often futures and options, use other petroleum products as their underlying asset. 
Airlines are forced to use instruments that use varying underlying assets because there is no large 
commercial market for instruments with jet fuel as the underlying asset. To hedge in a situation like 
this airlines cannot use a direct hedge and must use a cross-hedge where the hedging contracts used 
have commodities that are highly correlated with jet fuel. Airlines are presented with a small array of 
different commodity options, but the most widely used are West Texas Intermediate - Sweet Crude 
(WTI), Brent North Sea oil, heating oil, and gasoil. 
This study aims at finding risk minimizing reducing hedge ratios for the different contracts 
by using econometric techniques as well as Monte Carlo simulations. From this, the potential Value 
at Risk (VaR) will be derived from simulated portfolios. Airlines often feel that they should hedge, 
but admit that they are not sure of the best way to do so (Mercatus, 2013). Those that do hedge 
often do not have the most effective or successful hedges (Morrell and Swan, 2006). Much of the 
existing literature in this area addresses why firms hedge (Halls, 2005; Morrell and Swan, 2006), value 
creation from hedging (Carter et al, 2006; Jin, 2006; 2007), or transportation operations and hedging 
(Treanor et al, 2014; Lim and Hong, 2014). There is limited research (Adams and Gerner, 2012) that 
presents the optimal volatility reducing hedge ratio for airlines. Furthermore, no study has examined 
the hedge effectiveness of the abovementioned petroleum commodities for jet fuel. While other 
studies have attempted to provide this answer, they have focused more on the models than the 
results. This study will determine the ideal method for estimating the optimal hedge ratio as well as 
showing that if airlines are concerned about potential losses they should hedge.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Background 
After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), airlines in the U.S. were opened up to 
competitive markets. This ultimate goal for the airline industry was mentioned in the proper name of 
the legislation; “An Act to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, to encourage, develop, and 
attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market forces to determine the 
quality, variety, and price of air services, and for other purposes.” The introduction of competitive 
markets led to the entrance of 49 new airlines between 1979 and 1983 to join the 29 already in 
existence (Evans and Kessides, 1993).  Before the ADA, there was little to no competition because 
the routes and who serviced them were established by a federal organization called the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB). However, the CAB often took long amounts of time to investigate if a 
new route should be opened, decreasing efficiency. For example, many airlines filed suit against the 
CAB based on the granting of routes such as 443 F. 2d 745 Continental Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board and the corresponding suit 497 F. 2d 608 Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board. In these suits 
and a number of others, Continental and Delta are fighting over the Houston-Miami route. The time 
and bureaucratic work needed to establish or contest a route added to inefficiency in the industry. 
For that and other reasons, it was decided that the airline industry should be deregulated (Smith and 
Cox, 2008).  
Deregulation brought with it many improvements, such as the hub and spoke system, and is 
generally thought to have brought more benefits than drawbacks (Evans and Kessides, 1993). 
However, along with the introduction of new airlines came the introduction of low-cost carriers 
(LCC). These LCCs started to put downward pressure on fares presenting even more challenges for 
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legacy carriers. The effect can be such that when an LCC announces plans to add a new route the 
incumbent is forced to lower their fares (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). 
 To compete with LCCs some legacy airlines tried to create their own low-cost airline. These 
airlines were run by the legacy but offered the attractions of a LCC. All of the U.S. airlines attempts 
at starting a LCC failed. The only successful airline was Go! started by British Airways. The reason 
why it was successful while none of the others were was that it was able to enter into its own 
contract negotiations and was held as an independent subsidiary. These attempts managed only to 
cannibalize business and to lose money for legacies (Morrell, 2005; Pilarski, 2012). While Go! was 
able to negotiate its own contracts, the other legacies’ attempts were not. The “mini-me” (Pilarski, 
2012) airlines used the same labor negotiations as the larger airlines, meaning that any advantage that 
Southwest or other LCCs actually held was lost. Because of LCCs pushing down prices, jet fuel 
prices hitting record highs, and demand losing a decade’s worth of growth, the industry has been 
unable to make any mistakes and remain profitable. 
In the decade after deregulation, the airline industry lost $10 billion (Borenstein, 2011). The 
following decade, the general economic growth of the 1990s saw the airline industry reclaiming $5 
billion only to lose $54 billion dollars in the 2000’s (Smith and Cox, 2008; Borenstein, 2011). Much 
of the loss of the 2000s came as a result of the terrorist activities on September 11, 2001 and the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) leading to a $23.2 billion loss between 2001 and 2003 
(Smith Cox, 2008). Not all airlines felt the effect of this evenly; LCCs were able to avoid much of 
the problems that larger legacy carriers were not. This could be due to the fact that SARS was an 
international issue and many LCCs are domestic only. All airlines were affected by the drop in 
demand that happened in the early 2000s. After the terrorist attack of 9/11, demand for airlines fell 
20 percent, and was still 3% lower in 2008 than in 2000 (Borenstein, 2011). During the year 2005, 
four of the top seven largest domestic airlines in America were under Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
 6 
 
restructuring (United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, and Northwest Airlines). These issues 
have led some to determine that “there is no conventional long-run equilibrium explanation for an 
industry that perpetually loses money” (Borenstein, 2011; page 233). 
Due to the industry’s competitive nature and inability to raise airfare, airlines have very low 
profit margins. This means that any sort of external shock to their already narrow profit margins 
could result in a loss for the airline. Because of that, many airlines have created fuel hedging 
programs in an attempt to limit their exposure to upward swings in the cost of jet fuel. The problem 
with jet fuel is not specifically the cost but the volatility in the cost because risk does not necessarily 
depend on the cost of the asset.  
2.2. Network Industries 
Although railroads and commercial airlines are both network industries, airlines face 
different problems than the rest of the transportation sector. Network industries are made up of two 
components: the flows and the grid. The flows are the airplanes or the trains, while the grid is the 
infrastructure such as the airports, roadways, or railways (Smith and Cox, 2008). 
 However, of these producers, airlines are having the hardest time making consistent profits. 
Even though they were deregulated around the same time (airlines: 1978, railroads: 1980), railroads 
have been able to fair significantly better than airlines with increased productivity and increased 
financial performance. There are a number of factors that lead to this: more concentrated market, 
decreased competition caused by the ownership of the grid and the rails, and the ability to pass on 
fuel expenses. Railroads have been very successful in establishing a fuel surcharge, where the 
competitive airline markets have not been able to. This means that airlines are fully exposed to 
shocks in the jet fuel market.  Another disadvantage of airlines is that the firms that own the flows 
(planes) do not own the grid (airports).  Railroads are able to own the rails and although it is 
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difficult, they can expand their grid as needed. Airlines are unable to expand the grid because they 
do not own the airports. The government manages the air travel grid, which can often lead to delays 
and minimal infrastructure expansion (Smith and Cox, 2008). Because of these differences, the 
practices of airlines are very different than that of railroad and trucking firms.  
The risk that is being hedged by airlines is the unpredictability in the price of jet fuel. If jet 
fuel costs were constantly rising, then airlines could react appropriately, however because the price 
will change constantly and erratically, airlines have a harder time planning their expenses. For 
example, in 2008 the price of jet fuel in the beginning of January was $2.714 per gallon; it rose 54% 
in six months to $ 4.179 per gallon before falling 71% to $1.202 in December of that year. These 
price swings are potentially damaging when coupled with the fact that fuel can be over 35% of an 
airline’s costs (Southwest, 2013). While 2008 is by no means an average representation a typical year 
for jet fuel prices, it is an excellent representation of what can happen. Also, when airlines do face 
high jet fuel prices, there does not seem to be any possible short term capacity adjustments or way 
to tackle the sticky and fixed costs (Borenstein, 2011). To protect themselves from adverse price 
swings many airlines enter into derivative contracts and financial instruments, although, others have 
used other methods, like the 2012 Delta Air Lines purchase of an oil refinery (Delta Air Lines, 
2013).  
U.S. airlines often have a difficult time hedging their jet fuel because there is no publicly 
traded contract for a future purchase of it. Airlines can use an Over the Counter (OTC) contract 
called a forward that is specifically catered to the airline’s needs, but this is often a difficult task for 
an airline that refuels in many places. The only publicly traded futures contract for jet fuel is 
available at the Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM), and the use of this would open an airline 
up to foreign exchange risk. This means that airlines must undertake a practice called cross hedging. 
In this practice, an item that is highly correlated with jet fuel is hedged. For airlines, this means that 
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in lieu of using futures contracts for jet fuel, they would use one of a different petroleum product.  
Airlines are left with the choice of which commodity they would like to use as a cross hedge.  
Southwest Airlines is well known for hedging a high percentage of its fuel use and mentions 
“the Company has found that financial derivative instruments in other commodities, such as West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, Brent crude oil, and refined products, such as heating oil and 
unleaded gasoline, can be useful in decreasing its exposure to jet fuel price volatility” (Southwest, 
2013; page: 25). However, the use of instruments with underlying assets that differ from those 
actually used leads to a potential situation where the two commodities are not perfectly correlated. 
The difference between the spot and futures price is called the basis. For firms that cross hedge, 
there is an increase in the size of the basis, leading to an increased amount of basis risk.  
Fuel hedging or cross hedging may not be deemed suitable to each and every airline. US 
Airways goes unhedged because “There can be no assurance that, at any given time, we will have 
derivatives in place to provide any particular level of protection against increased fuel costs or that 
our counterparties will be able to perform under our derivative contracts” (US Airways, 2014; page 
20). US Airways also mention the loses from hedging due to downward price swings and the 
potential need for large amounts of capital to settle debts. The annual report for the SEC, Form 10-
K, also mentions that reformed laws could potentially make it harder for airlines and any firm that 
uses derivatives to hedge. Another problem with jet fuel hedging is that there is no way to be sure of 
the connection between the two assets. Southwest notes that  “the correlation between WTI crude 
oil prices and jet fuel prices during recent periods has not been as strong as in the past, and therefore 
the Company can no longer demonstrate that derivatives based on WTI crude oil prices will result in 
effective hedges on a prospective basis” (Southwest, 2014; page 27). Even with the trouble that 
cross-hedging can give an airline; most U.S. airlines still choose to participate (Lim and Hong, 2014). 
Airlines do not have successful hedging strategies (Morrell and Swan, 2006; Mercatus, 2013) and this 
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study will assess and measure the risks of cross-hedging while identifying suitable commodities for 
use in hedging.  
2.3. Introduction to Risk 
Airlines face many sources of risk. These risks can often be mitigated by entering into 
contracts and using financial instruments. This study examines the current uses and the potential 
uses of contracts and financial instruments to mitigate risk for airlines. The largest area of risk for an 
international airline is commodity price risk. For an airline the commodity most used is jet fuel (or 
jet kerosene), which can represent over 30% of the airlines costs. Other financial risks that airlines 
face are lesser than that of jet fuel, but still present a credible threat to operations. These would 
include interest rate risk and foreign currency risk. Interest rates are very important to airlines, which 
are often very heavily debt financed and have a more difficult time attracting equity (Loudon, 2004). 
Thus, an advantage or disadvantage in borrowing costs could carry through to the rest of the 
airline’s operations. The commodity risk presented to airlines in the form of jet fuel is an important 
issue. As the number of passengers grows each year and as ticket prices do not grow accordingly, 
airlines risk losing their already narrow profit margins. However, by hedging airlines could better 
protect the profit margins in times when the price of fuel is sporadic or increasing.  
 Casually risk and uncertainty have taken similar definition, but there still exists a distinction 
between the two. Uncertainty is the state of not knowing future events and/or not being able to 
measure the probability of such events happening. Risk is the state of knowing the likelihood or 
probability of an event happening in the future. This would mean that risk is measurable uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). The role of risk in a firm is a dynamic one. Due to the nature of risk versus 
uncertainty, firms are able to mitigate risk at a certain level of confidence, protecting themselves 
from the source of risk. The other trait of risk is that profit can be defined as a reward or a premium 
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for perusing a risk. By taking a risk, investors may be able to increase their return compared to if 
they did not take the risk at all. This is most easily seen through the most basic example of 
comparing a portfolio to a treasury bill. A portfolio may be able to offer a higher return rate, but it 
also runs the risk of giving the investor a low one, or even losing the investor’s money. A treasury 
bill, however, is a zero-risk investment where the investor receives a low rate of return but is 
guaranteed that rate of return. The risk that this study will focus on is a financial risk. Airlines face 
many other risks, such as crashes or terrorist attacks, but they mitigate those risks in different ways. 
2.4. Financial Risk 
Financial risk is a general term used to discuss many types of risk that involve money.  The 
previous example comparing a portfolio to a treasury bill is an example of financial risk. However 
financial risk also includes other types of risk. Some of the most common types of financial risks fall 
into the category of Market Risk. As the name implies, these risks exist because there is a market 
that sets prices and these prices are always changing. 
2.4.1. Default/Counter Party Risk 
Counter party risk is a situation in which risk is caused by the actions of the other party in 
the contract. This risk exists in some form or another in all contracts. The main source of risk is the 
uncertainty as to if the other party will either abandon their agreement or would no longer be able to 
meet the agreement. This risk can often be mitigated with a well written contract and is not always a 
problem between two large firms. For airlines especially, there is always a risk that the airline and the 
unions will not reach agreeable terms for a contract and the unionize workers could strike. Default 
risk is very similar to counter party risk except that it not that the opposite party in the contract is 
unwilling to honor the agreement it is that they are unable to. If the firm with which the airline had a 
contract goes bankrupt then there isn’t much a well written contract would do to help the airline. 
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The problem could also be that the airlines would be the defaulting party. Airlines have to worry if 
they will have the future liquidity and collateral to meet counter party demands (US Airways Group, 
2012).  
Another example of counter party risk for airlines are unions. Airlines always run the risk 
that a negation between firm and employees will not be reached, resulting in the loss of its 
workforce. Airlines also worry about if credit card processors will continue to honor purchases 
made. Although it is unlikely to happen, airlines do mention that “under certain conditions, to hold 
an amount of our cash (referred to as a “holdback”) equal to some or all of the advance ticket sales 
that have been processed by that company” (US Airways, 2012; page 18). 
2.5. Market Risks 
2.5.1. Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is when a firm selects a type of interest rate, but is unsure as to where the 
market will take the interest rate in the future. A firm has two different options, a fixed rate or a 
floating rate. A fixed rate is where the firm would lock into a rate and it would stay the same over 
the life of the loan. The risk in this scenario is the uncertainty of the rate; if the interest rate were to 
drop over the life of the loan, the firm would be paying more than if it had opted for a floating rate. 
A floating rate loan is one where the rate changes along with the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(Libor) which helps to determine the interest rate. This uncertainty is that the interest rate may 
increase, and the firm would have to pay more than if it had opted for a fixed rate loan. As 
mentioned earlier, airlines are mainly financed through debt due to the high cost of equity (Loudon, 
2004). Although part of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) Theorem of capital structure states that 
financing through debt or equity should not affect the firm, in practical applications parts of the MM 
theorem can be assumed away (Dufey and Srinivasulu, 1983). The macroeconomic effect that 
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happens along with interest rate changes can also prove to be very influential to airlines’ operations. 
Increases and decreases in interest rates can represent a larger economic issue, which could affect 
the airline both financially and operationally (Morrell and Swan, 2006). 
2.5.2. Equity Risk 
Equity risks are associated with the movement of values of stocks in the stock market. While 
this risk is most often experienced by investors that does not mean that firms are unaffected by it.  
Management at firms makes choices that are designed to reduce equity risk and make the firm’s 
stock more desirable to the investor. Equity risk can also be deconstructed into the commodity risk, 
interest rate risk, and foreign currency exchange risk (Adler and Dumas, 1984). This can be 
accomplished because the value of equity is based on the perceived value of the company. For 
example, if investors feel that a firm is more exposed to petroleum, its stock value will be more 
sensitive to increases and decreases in the petroleum markets. Airlines often have volatile earning, 
which can be less attractive to investors. This can be seen by the lower than average price-earnings 
ratios that are found in the airline industry (Loudon, 2004). While airlines cannot use a specific 
financial instrument to manage equity risk, it can be reduced by a series of different financial and 
operational decisions.  
2.5.3. Commodity Risk 
Commodity risk deals with the uncertainty in the future price of a good in the market. The 
commodity markets tend to be more sensitive to price changes leading both producers and 
consumers to enter into derivative contracts. Commodity risk is the largest risk for airlines. Even 
with the increased efficiency of airplanes, jet fuel can still be over 30% of an airline’s operating cost. 
There is much literature that exists on this subject and the majority is connected with how hedging 
affects airlines. The reason for this debate is that while there are the risks for changes in the price, 
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airlines that use fuel hedging to control commodity price risk do not always have lower operating 
expenses (Lim and Hong, 2014). Delta Air Lines decided to mitigate potential commodity risk by 
purchasing an oil refinery in 2012. This act of vertical integration shows that some airlines do not 
think that financial instruments are optimal in controlling commodity risk. Fuel represented 36% of 
Delta’s operating expense in 2012 increased from 30% in 2010, over that same period average fuel 
price per gallon increased from, $2.33 to $3.25, or 39% (Delta Air Lines, 2012). Wild swings in 
commodity prices can decrease the profitability of airlines, and due to the nature of competition in 
the airline sector, outside of hedging, there is little airlines can do to pass on these costs. 
2.5.4. Currency Risk 
Foreign exchange risk is the variability of a firm’s cash flows caused by uncertain changes in 
the exchange rate. The variability in cash flows leads to a change in the value of the firm. Along with 
exchange risk there are measures of foreign currency exposure. Exposure is a measure of the 
amount that the firm is affected to foreign currency changes. Exposure exists in four different 
measures. Translation exposure is the exposure of the firm when it formally converts a foreign 
currency to its functional currency. Transaction exposure is the exposure of a firm that has assets, 
debt, or contractual obligations denominated in a foreign currency.  Tax exposure depends upon the 
country’s tax laws and how losses or gains in foreign currency are recorded. Finally, operating 
exposure is the amount which exchange rates and therefore prices affect the firm. Operating 
exposure is also a component of inflation risk. Inflation risk is the risk that inflation will affect the 
purchasing power of the currency adversely. 
 Transaction exposure affects many firms, but non-American international airlines are 
especially sensitive to it. For example, Singapore Airlines generates a surplus in all foreign currencies 
except for the United States Dollar (USD). This is because “most capital expenditure, fuel costs and 
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aircraft leasing costs” are denominated in USD (Singapore Airlines, 2012). This means that they 
have to convert from Singapore Dollars to US Dollars to cover expenses.  
2.5.5. Basis Risk 
Basis risk is the difference between the price on the contract and the price that the firm 
actually paid for the item it used. Normally, for a firm this would include transportation costs of the 
asset and any imperfect correlation between the asset and the futures price. For an airline, this basis 
risk includes not only the difference in the cost from the underlying asset to the price that they 
actually pay for the jet fuel used, but the fact that they are cross hedging increases the basis risk. For 
example, if an airline uses WTI crude to hedge their jet fuel exposure it most likely will not follow jet 
fuel exactly. This difference in relationship is part of hedge effectiveness but it also is considered to 
be part of the basis risk. This is evident in Figure 2.1, which shows the price of jet fuel graphed 
along with the jet fuel crack spread. The spread represents the cost of refining jet fuel and graphed 
along with the cost of jet fuel. The pattern can be seen that there are other factors that influence the 
relationship. For hedgers, airlines especially, this means that the basis and relationship between the 
assets are always changing. This means that a hedge ratio should be recalculated.  
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of Jet Fuel Price and Crack Spread 
Source: EIA 
2.6. Value at Risk 
Value at risk (VaR) is a measurement of downside risk. A more specific definition from 
Wilson et al (2007) defines VaR as “a single, summary statistic indicating the portfolio loss that will 
be exceeded with a probability of 1-c, during a given period of time (t), under normal market 
conditions, where c is the specified confidence level.” This means that VaR should be interpreted as 
a value which, at a certain confidence level (90%, 95%, 99%), the portfolio will lose no more than. 
For example, a one week $5 million VaR at a 95% confidence level means that in one week, the 
portfolio will not lose an excess of $5 million. The concept of VaR was originally made popular by 
J.P. Morgan & Co. when it was said that the chairman of the firm wanted to know with confidence 
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what the maximum amount that could be lost that day was (Hallerbach and Menkveld, 1999). From 
there, the measure was made easily available in the Risk Metrics program of J.P. Morgan & Co.  
2.6.1. Benefits of VaR 
VaR is beneficial for a number of reasons. First, VaR is easily describable. The result is given 
without statistical terms and could be considered more intuitive because it is given in a dollar 
amount or percentage. This is one reason why firms will post it in their annual reports. Airlines will 
often have a sentence mentioning the cost to the firm of a one dollar increase in the price per gallon 
of jet fuel. Along with this, it focuses on downside risk giving an easy to understand worst case 
scenario. Another benefit to VaR is that it is that it can be used for different time periods. For 
example, a monthly VaR may be used by a firm that feels it would need a month to respond, while 
day traders could use a daily VaR. This is beneficial because it is highly unlikely that an airline or any 
firm would be able to entirely liquidate a position in a day.  Finally, VaR can be calculated by 
assuming a normal distribution or other distribution of prices. By using a Monte Carlo simulation 
the VaR can determined with any distribution as well making Monte Carlo the preferred method of 
determining VaR (Wilson et al, 2007). 
2.6.2. Expected Shortfall (ES) 
Expected Shortfall (also known as Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)) is a measure similar to 
the traditional VaR, but can measure the potential losses outside of normal market conditions. It can 
also be used to measure the VaR of individual parts of the portfolio. Because ES has the property of 
subadditivity, the whole should equal the sum of the parts. However, the traditional measure of VaR 
lacks this property and thus is it potentially possible for the VaR of a portfolio to exceed the sum of 
the VaR of the weighted average of the assets (Harris and Shen, 2005). Another benefit of ES is that 
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it is more sensitive to the skewedness and kurtosis of the distribution of losses, allowing the value at 
risk to be quantified at different rates. 
2.6.3. Flaws of VaR 
Due to the fact that VaR often assumes a normal distribution, there can be many problems. 
For example, using the wrong distribution or assuming the wrong kurtosis/skewedness can lead to a 
misrepresentation of VaR (Barry et al., 2009). Another potential problem with VaR is that there are 
different ways of computing it. While this is not a major problem, it does lead to debate over the 
best method (Manfredo and Leuthold, 1999), and it can lead to the potential misunderstanding of 
which method was used as some methods lead to an over/underestimation of the value at risk. 
There are also criticisms of the decomposition based VaR.  
2.6.4. Methods of Calculating VaR 
As mentioned earlier, there are many different techniques to calculate VaR, and each one has 
its own benefits and drawbacks. The first method is the parametric method also called the 
variance/covariance method. This term is applied to methods that cover historical volatility, implied 
volatility, and other conditional time series models (Manfredo and Leuthold, 1999). JP Morgan’s 
Risk Metrics is an example of parametric technique that uses exponentially weighted moving averages 
to measure a time sensitive volatility. The criticism of the parametric technique is that it assumes 
normality, which would cause problems in leptokurtosis and non-normal distributions. Another 
criticism is that the parametric method is not suitable for long term forecasting, because of scaling. 
The other main way of establishing VaR is from simulations. These methods, called Full-Valuation 
methods, include historical simulations, Monte Carlo simulations, and bootstrapping. Non 
parametric VaR “attempts to model the entire return distribution instead of providing a point 
estimate of volatility.” (Manfredo and Leuthold, 1999) These simulations methods provide a fuller 
 18 
 
picture of the VaR but they are often lengthy to create and do not always account for trends. 
Another criticism of Monte Carlo is they “do not have the ability to obtain an explicit 
variance/covariance matrix” (Manfredo and Leuthold,1999). However, modern software packages 
are able to overcome this obstacle.   
2.7. Hedging 
Hedging is taking the opposite position of what the firm normally faces. For example, an 
airline which receives revenue in Japanese Yen would sell the Yen at a specified rate, thus closing 
out its position and mitigating the translation risk. Anytime more than the revenue is hedged, the 
firm starts to speculate and therefore cannot use hedge accounting (FAS 133). A hedge should not 
be considered a speculative move, which would be a firm using it to increase profit. A hedge is an 
attempt to smooth out the peaks and troughs in prices. The idea of zero sum means that over time a 
hedged firm should be worth the same as an unhedged firm (Morrell and Swan, 2006). 
Hedging can also be described as a way of making what was once the undesired outcome 
desirable. For airlines, this is especially true for fuel prices. By purchasing derivatives, an airline owns 
a contract that becomes more valuable as the fuel prices increase. This means that as fuel price 
increases, the increased cost is offset by the increased value in the airline’s contract portfolio. This is 
met with the other possible outcome where fuel prices drop. While the contract that they took out is 
now losing the firm money, by being worth less than they paid for it, that is met by the fuel that they 
use being cheaper.  
2.8. Financial Instruments 
Financial instruments are perhaps one of the most widely utilized mechanisms to mitigate 
risk. A derivative hedge is a system that allows a firm to lock in at a certain price for an asset that it 
needs in the future.  The hedge uses derivative or a contract/agreement to purchase an underlying 
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asset in the future at an agreed upon price. Derivatives contracts are for standardized amounts of 
standardized assets. These traits make it easily traded, which is another reason why they are so 
popular. This means that if for any reason either party wants to no longer be in the contract, they 
will have an easy time canceling out its position. For airlines, the most popular are swaps and 
futures. 
2.8.1. Forwards 
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy/sell an asset in the future. 
These contracts can be tailored to fit either party’s needs (i.e. an uncommon amount of the asset or 
an uncommonly traded asset.) These contracts are less liquid as they are specific to the needs of the 
parties, making it harder for either party to renege. This type of contract would mainly be used if an 
option or a futures contract was not available for the asset or quantity. If either party in a forward 
contracts is unable to meet the agreement then there is little that can be done, unless a measure is 
written into the contract that deals with such an event. Finally, while some small airlines use 
forwards, it is uncommon for a larger airline to use them. This is due to the difficulty of taking 
physical deliveries of the commodity at many different locations. However for a smaller airline, a 
fuel forward could guarantee that the airline knows the exact cost for fuel for the contracted time 
period. 
2.8.2. Futures 
A futures contract is an agreement for one party to purchase an underlying asset for an 
agreed upon price at an agreed upon date, called the maturity date. For a futures contract, the 
benefits of standardization make them appealing to both users of the assets and speculators on the 
price of the asset. Because delivery of the asset has to be taken with a future, they are often sold very 
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closely to their maturity date, but are often not executed for delivery by speculators or financial 
firms. 
For a futures contract, the agreement is handled by a clearing house. Along with this, each 
party must put up an amount of money that will be traded in the event of a price change on the 
underlying asset. This account is called a margin account and the amount of money that is put in a 
margin account is determined by the maximum likely amount of which the underlying asset’s price 
could change. This prevents either party from completely ignoring the contract as the funds in their 
margin account are already changing along with price flows. Another benefit of the clearing house is 
that the broker of the sale is the member of the clearing house. This means that a broker is less likely 
to sponsor someone who he or she thinks is likely to default. 
2.8.3. Options 
The final common derivative is called an option. It is so called because it gives the holder the 
option to exercise or not exercise the contract at its maturity date, for a European contract, while an 
American contract allows for the holder of the contract to exercise it at any point before or on the 
maturity date. The holder of a call option holds a contract that gives them the right to purchase the 
underlying asset at the agreed upon price. The holder of a put option has the ability to sell the 
underlying asset at the agreed upon price. 
Because an option is not going to be exercised if it is not profitable, there is no need to 
worry about a party not fulfilling the agreement. However, because there is that option to not 
exercise, the party that is issuing the option receives a premium on top of the agreed upon price. 
Aptly named the “Option Premium,” this fee means that even if the party decides not to exercise 
the contract, the issuer is not entirely without gain. 
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There are many different types of combinations of longing/ shorting call/put options that 
an airline may take out at the same time. For example, by “shorting” or selling a put option at the 
same time a “longing” or purchasing a call option for different strike prices, an airline can create a 
boundary in which it knows its fuel cost will be. Also, it can create a collar which uses the Option 
Premium from the shorted option to cover the option premium of the longed option, creating what 
it called a “costless collar”. 
2.8.4. Swaps 
Swaps are an agreement between two firms to trade a fixed rate and a floating rate at a 
mutually beneficial rate. Suppose Firm A wants a fixed rate loan but was quoted too high a rate, 
while the floating rate they were quoted was a low rate. Also suppose Firm B wants a floating rate 
loan, but their quote was too high, while their fixed rate loan quote was low. These two firms could 
get together and swap loans, with there being a small premium paid by the firm that is receiving the 
better interest rate. Even with that small premium, both firms receive the type of loan they want at 
an interest rate that is lower than they were quoted. Swaps are used by airlines as well as firms in 
many different industries. 
Although interest rate swaps are the most common across most markets, the airline industry 
takes advantage of commodity swaps (Alaska Air Group, 2014). Also known as fixed price swaps, 
these allow an airline to trade paying the floating rate of fuel for a fixed rate of fuel. The underwriter 
of the swap would get paid a fixed rate by the airline, and in return would be paid if the price of the 
underlying commodity rose above the fixed rate. This is much like the example above, except in lieu 
of the Libor, the traded commodity’s price is used.  
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2.8.5. Natural Hedge 
A natural hedge occurs when the potential undesirable outcome is matched with a desirable 
outcome without the use of derivatives. Delta’s purchase of the Trainer refinery has developed a 
natural hedge. As costs increase for the airline’s fuel, the revenue from the refinery would increase at 
the same time. As long as the products remain correlated during the changes in price, the refinery’s 
revenue should be inversely proportional to the fuel costs of the airline. 
2.9. Advantages of Hedging 
Hedges provide many benefits. The first of these is that it can smooth cash flows for firms 
by protecting them from peaks and troughs in the market. The second advantage is that firms that 
hedge have better control over when profits are realized. Another possible benefit is that firms 
which hedge are worth more. The final suggested benefit is that a firm near bankruptcy would be 
able to perform better if it were to hedge. 
2.9.1. Smooth Cash Flows 
Of the many proposed benefits that befall a firm which hedges, first and foremost is the idea 
of smooth cash flows. It is an understood assumption that a firm hedges to prevent volatility in cash 
flows from market shocks. However, this assumption is not necessarily correct. Copeland and Joshi 
(1996) found that foreign currency hedging did not and could not reduce cash flow volatility. By 
comparing the volatility of 198 comparable firms that were hedged and unhedged over a 10-year 
period they came to the conclusion that the monthly volatility of a firm was not significantly 
different enough to warrant a foreign currency hedge. Along with this, the authors also simulated the 
effect of an optimal hedge on specific firms. With the benefit of hindsight, they came to the 
conclusion that even the best hedge would only reduce quarterly cash flow volatility by 10%. Morrell 
and Swan (2006) answer the question of “Does hedging reduce volatility?” with a simple 
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“Sometimes.” Writing on airline jet fuel hedging they suggest that the firm should only hedge when 
one time shocks to the market are likely. This means that if there is likely to be turmoil in an oil 
producing region than an airline should hedge its fuel costs, however, if these events are unlikely 
then it should not.  
 Morrell and Swan (2006), though, go on to give anecdotal evidence as to how hedging could 
indeed make cash flow more volatile. The idea behind a hedge is that if the oil price increases, while 
operating costs go up, the value of the derivative contract increases, offsetting the fuel price 
increase. The other outcome in a hedged scenario is that the price of the fuel input decreases. While 
the fuel contract is worth less than it was, that does not matter because the operating costs are now 
cheaper. As mentioned, the authors see a flaw with this kind of thinking. They create a scenario 
where the price of oil increases because it is demand driven and not supply driven. In this event, 
when the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increases the oil price will be high at the same time 
that air travel demand is strong. This means that an airline would have increased cash flows from 
both an increase in travel and an increase in hedge value. At this point the hedge is no longer 
offsetting potential losses but has doubled the potential gains. However, if there is a slump in GDP 
growth or a recession, the price of oil could decrease at the same time as there is a lull in demand for 
air travel. If this were the case, the hedge would be worth less and although the operating costs for 
fuel are down, the cash flow from travel would also be down. This case would describe how Morrell 
and Swan imagine hedging to make cash flow more volatile. 
2.9.2. Profit Realization 
Along with volatility dampening, there is an idea that hedging is beneficial to a company 
because it allows the firm to choose when the gains from the hedge are realized. Anecdotally 
speaking this means that if the firm were to have a bad quarter, it could liquidate some of its hedge 
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to make the quarter look more profitable than it actually is. The same could be done with a very 
successful quarter if hedge losses needed to be hidden. However, going beyond that very basic 
example there are many opportunities to firms. Smith and Stulz (1985) explain that a hedge can be 
used to control the tax costs of a firm. By using methods similar to those described earlier, a firm 
would potentially hide gains in a hedge if it thought it was likely to have to pay a lot in taxes. 
However, they do note that such a procedure could potentially hurt investor confidence due to the 
fact that investors often times see the before-tax income.  To prevent firms from doing this the tax 
code was updated in 1998 by the FASB with FAS 133 which makes it so firms must show their 
position on hedges and value the hedge at the market rate. This practice, called mark-to-market, 
creates an increase in transparency for the investor into the firm’s actions. 
Morrell and Swan (2006) also point out that investors like and often value predictability, so 
even if a firm could manipulate its cash flow to take advantage of the tax code, it may also be 
damaging its relationship with investors.  They also mention that another supposed benefit from 
controlling when hedging is declared is that a firm could potentially have an increase in cash flows 
during an industry down turn. The authors describe a situation much like Southwest often takes 
advantage of, where having a surplus or liquidity at the right moment allows the firm to take 
advantage of purchasing assets at distressed prices. However, it seems that with a downturn in the 
industry most larger airlines are also cutting back on capital investment. Disatnik, Duchin, and 
Schmidt (2013) found that hedging can affect cash flows in a way that could lead to an increased line 
of credit from a bank. They found that if a firm can successfully control cash flows then that can 
lead to increased debt limits from banks and potentially lower bond rate when releasing debt. 
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2.9.3. Value Creation 
Another disputed benefit of hedges is that they add value to the firm. This claim is one of 
the most controversial claims of the benefits of hedging. The most influential paper on the subject is 
by Allayannis and Weston (2001). In this paper, they look at the value of a firm that uses foreign 
currency derivatives to hedge. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, they establish that a 
hedging premium, or value added by having a hedging program, is nearly 5%. Tobin’s Q is a 
combination of the market value of the equities and the liabilities divided by the book value of 
equity and liabilities. Allayannis and Weston did this by looking at 720 nonfinancial firms from a 
period of 1990-1995. The potential problem with measuring value with the proxy of Tobin’s Q is 
that in their paper they do not establish value as a function of firm characteristics or actions. This 
makes it harder to connect value creation with the firm’s policy of hedging.  However, Jin and Jorion 
(2006) found that the increase in value does not seem to happen when oil and gas producers hedge. 
The following year, Jin and Jorion (2007) looked at gold mining to see if hedging added any value to 
those firms. They for the second time found no connection between firm value and hedging. Much 
like in the oil industry Jin and Jorion suspect that because these commodities are so easily traded, 
investors do not value a hedging program. If investors did value it, they could easily establish their 
own hedge within their portfolio.1 
Carter et al (2006) found that the firm value of airlines could increase by as much as 10% 
due to a hedging program. The authors are clear to point out that such a premium exists due to the 
program, and that an airline cannot increase the value of the firm by just increasing the jet fuel hedge 
                                                          
1
 The assumption that corporate finance affects firm’s value contradicts the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which states that 
in well-functioning markets with neutral taxes and rational investors; corporate structure does not matter. The MM 
theorem can be assumed away in real markets (Dufey and Srinivasulu, 1983). This is due to the advantage a firm has over 
an investor in hedging. An investor faces entry barriers in real markets caused by the expense of derivatives and the 
availability of them for investors. The firm also has an advantage in information. Managers are better informed about the 
firm than investors, meaning that they are better qualified to mitigate the risk. However, it is evident (Morrell and Swan, 
2006; Mercatus, 2013) that airline managers lack expertise in fuel hedging. 
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ratio. However, they link this to the idea that airlines would be able to increase capital investment 
during downturns, which as is mentioned earlier is unlikely, and that investors value hedging. This 
latter possibility goes against the opinions of Morrell and Swan (2006) who state that perhaps 
investors do not value a hedge as greatly as some may think. They cite easyJet’s stock price which 
rose three percent after the announcement that they would start to hedge after being previously 
unhedged. However, three days later the stock price had returned to the levels prior to the 
announcement. The authors then rule out any significance by this blip in stock price by pointing out 
it was lower than the typical blip of a traffic announcement.  
2.9.4. Bankruptcy 
While there are many conflicting opinions about the potential benefits for a firm by hedging, 
there is a general consensus about the benefits to a nearly bankrupt firm. The reasoning behind this 
assumption is that a firm which is near bankruptcy would benefit greatly both by knowing part of 
the operating costs for the firm at the start of the year and also by avoiding swings in the market. 
For a firm that is nearly insolvent, it may not be around long enough to experience the opposite 
swing of the market, so hedging becomes even more valuable. Copeland and Joshi (1996) call this 
benefit an extension of the “time to ruin.” They bring up the fact that large firms that are not likely 
to enter into insolvency are able to self-insure and do not need or use hedges. However, smaller 
firms might need to use a different form of insurance against the same risk. They go on to add that 
as long as the correlation between operating cash flows and foreign currency cash flows are high, a 
foreign currency hedge would be beneficial to a small firm or one which has a short “time to ruin.”    
Morrell and Swan (2006) discuss a different potential benefit for cash strapped firms with 
hedges. They cite the 2004 move by Delta Air Lines to sell profitable hedges early to increase 
liquidity. The gain of $83 million allowed Delta to enter into other fuel hedges for later dates. The 
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authors also mention that the earlier mentioned practice of allowing a firm to hide profits and losses 
from a hedge is even more valuable to a nearly insolvent firm. This is because a normal firm would 
only be able to hide the result from the hedge for so long before it became public. However, for a 
nearly bankrupt firm, there is no need to worry about the future.  Morrell and Swan (2006) discuss 
that this could be used by a firm that is about to enter into labor negotiations with a union. The firm 
would not want to look more profitable to unions than it really is, even if it means misleading stock 
holders.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) take hedging and bankruptcy a step further when they discuss how 
firms can actually hedge the costs of bankruptcy. By creating a hedging portfolio that would increase 
in value as the firm became bankrupt, the firm could appear more stable to investors. This would be 
especially attractive to investors who are looking to buy the firm’s bonds. Due to the order of 
payout on debt from a bankrupt firm, with first taxes being taken from the firm and then bond 
holders and then shareholders, if a firm can secure enough money to pay all of these investors back 
at the time of insolvency, then they could potentially increase their current cash flows. However, it 
should be stated that all benefits that hedging could provide to a nearly bankrupt firm are 
questionable because it is often times unlikely that a firm would have that much liquidity to be 
entering into hedges. 
Wei and Starks (2013) look at the sensitivity of a firm’s stock price to exchange rates. The 
authors look at how related exchange rate exposure elasticity and the likelihood of financial distress, 
growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. By using a multi-stage regression they were able to 
find out that firms in distress were more likely to have a stock price that was sensitive to foreign 
exchange exposure. They mention that this is especially important because although the benefits of a 
distressed firm hedging are widely known, the ability to hedge in those dire straits is often not 
possible.  
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2.10. Disadvantages of Hedging 
There are many disadvantages of hedging. One of which is that the hedge may prevent an 
existing mechanism that was already protecting the firm. Also, hedges can be difficult to design 
leading to potential issues that exist in cross-hedging. Furthermore, it can be argued that because 
hedging should over time have zero gains and losses, it should not be done. Finally, there are many 
different methods to use in hedging, leading to conflicts as to which method to choose. 
2.10.1. Loss of Natural Hedge 
While the potential benefits to hedging have been established, there are some potential faults 
too. One such fault is that a derivative hedge can sometimes be created where there is already a 
natural hedge. Copeland and Joshi (1996) discuss a situation between a European airline and an 
American airplane producer. In the description of the problem it is discussed that the airline creates 
a derivative hedge to protect itself from foreign currency risk. However, there was already a natural 
hedge that protected the firm from that risk. Much like the oil situation described by Morrell and 
Swan (2006), by creating a hedge it made it so the good times were better and the bad times were 
worse. But because the airline did have costs in both Euros and US dollars, a strengthening in either 
currency would have not disrupted cash flows. However, with the derivative hedge and the loss of 
the natural hedge, there is now a risk.  
2.10.2. Difficult to Design 
Another potential problem caused by hedging is the ability to easily create a hedge. Going 
beyond the costs of creating a hedge, how hedge-able is the firm’s cost or output and should that 
even be hedged? After the success of Southwest Airlines’ fuel hedge in the early 2000s, many other 
passenger airlines have started to hedge their fuel costs. However, as Halls (2005) discusses, a fuel 
hedge is not as straightforward as it may seem. He starts off by exposing potential problems with 
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hedging. One such problem is that for fuel hedging, the actual asset is not associated with a widely 
traded derivative. Since jet fuel is only traded on the Tokyo Commodities Exchange (TOCOM) a 
foreign firm cannot easily hedge its fuel use without creating more risk from foreign currency 
fluctuations. This means that there will have to be some cross price hedging, where the firm hedges 
a different commodity to the one it actually uses, but figures that the price will correlate to the 
commodity it uses.  For fuel there are many options from Brent, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), 
heating oil, and even gasoil. While Brent is often used because it closely follows jet fuel, which does 
not mean it is the natural choice. As Halls (2005) mentions anecdotally the story of a banker who 
pointed out that while some firms used heating oil, there could be great losses in those hedges 
because at times heating oil and jet fuel didn’t track each other at all. But even with that, on a simple 
regression he found that over a period of two years heating oil was around 90% correlated and crude 
was about 80%.  
When Adams and Gerner (2012) looked at cross hedging with error correction model and 
GARCH models, they found that gasoil would be the closest to jet fuel for a period of less than 
three months and beyond that Brent or WTI would be a better substitute.  However, even with this 
information, there are still unknown variables that could cause the correlation to change, like a 
change in the cost of the jet fuel differential. The differential is a premium for further refining of the 
fuel that is needed; however, it can change by large amounts for seemingly unknown reasons. 
Another possible issue with this study is that they included forwards as an option of the cross hedge. 
Because the nature of forwards is that the contract is written specifically for the party, thus making it 
very illiquid, it does not seem practical that an airline would engage in cross price fuel hedging with 
forwards. Also, the authors note that forwards rates are determined by investment banks which 
include the futures rate in addition to their margin, or as the authors put it “the pricing on the OTC 
market crucially depends on the liquidity of the standard futures contracts as investment banks need 
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to re-hedge their OTC commodity positions.” Southwest Airlines does a blend of different 
petroleum commodities to diversify and help prevent the problem of one commodity not being 
100% correlated to jet fuel (Southwest, 2012). However, while the Adams and Gerner paper, which 
was focused more around European designated jet fuel risk, this study is focused around U.S. jet 
fuel risk. Although this may seem like a subtle difference, it could explain why they found gasoil to 
be the superior hedging instrument for contracts with near-term maturities. 
Another potential problem with cross-hedging is that that even if a suitable commodity can 
be found, will investors and shareholders value it. Both of the Jin and Jorion papers (2006, 2007) 
came to the same conclusion; that commodity hedging doesn’t necessarily add value to a company. 
Compared to the other works on the subject this seems to be counter intuitive. It has been assumed 
that investors like risk reducing practices, however, the two industries that Jin and Jorion (2006, 
2007) looked at were both commodity industries. This means that investors likely chose to invest in 
these industries to be exposed to the commodity price risk.  
Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) make the argument that while corporate management of 
foreign exchange risk may not matter in theory, it makes a difference in the real world. The crux of 
their argument is that the assumptions that have to be made for certain theories to work make them 
impractical in actual application. Starting with the idea that the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
should be represented in foreign currency exchange, then any management move wouldn’t matter. If 
the value of the currency relative to a different currency is establish by their purchasing power, the 
nominal amount doesn’t matter as much, because it has the same buying power. However, as the 
authors point out, things can be mispriced making it so that the law of one price doesn’t always 
hold. Also, the changes in a currency’s valuation lag behind the purchasing power. This means that 
while they should ideally catch up, there will be a time that the exchanged currency does not have 
the same purchasing power. The next arguments they make are against the idea of the zero sum. To 
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combat the arguments that say hedging isn’t worthwhile because in the long run everything will 
cancel out. The authors make the point that creditors value predictability and smooth cash flows, 
and that some firms are not in the position to ride out the bumpy cash flows. Finally they address 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem’s argument that the investor can do anything the firm can and undo 
anything the firm does that they do not like. Dufey and Srinivasulu point out that again, in the real 
world, this is not practical. Private investors face barriers like costs and availability that firms do not 
face, or that they are more easily able to afford. Also, private investors are likely to be less informed 
than their corporate counterparts. 
2.10.3. Don’t Always Work 
A different area that people question if hedging is worth it is in foreign currency 
transactions. Looking at global equity portfolios, Chincarini (2008) found that a currency hedge 
during the Asian crisis would have been inefficient. With the benefit of hindsight Chincarini (2008) 
creates a number of likely hedges for the time period of 1999-2006 and finds that all of these 
potential and possible hedges did not reduce monthly volatility of the portfolio nor did it improve 
the risk-adjusted return performance.  He goes on to add anecdotally that the best course of action 
for this time period would have been to remain unhedged. This could be due to the fact that he 
found a 0.249 correlation across all currencies so it is likely that a firm working with a global basket 
of currencies would likely be very well diversified.  This goes against the findings of Glen and Jorion 
(1993) who found that a currency hedge in the period of 1979-1990 significantly improved the 
performance of portfolios, especially those with unhedged bonds. They also found that certain 
hedging strategies were able to get substantially higher yields without increased risk. However, Jorion 
(1994) specifies that while useful, hedging that includes “overlay strategies” is inefficient because 
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they do not account for the possible relationship between the underlying asset’s value change and 
the change in currency. 
Another problem is that over time the traditional benchmark used for hedging, WTI, has 
started to follow jet fuel less closely than it did in the past. Previously, the price movements for WTI 
and other crude oils moved along similar to the movements of jet fuel. However, recently the 
movements have become less correlated. As the gap between crude and jet fuel prices increases, it 
will significantly hurt those who hedge with WTI futures. While there are many reasons for the gap 
increases, one potential reason is that the U.S. is exploiting new sources of crude oil, which is 
lowering the price (IATA, 2014). 
2.10.4. Zero Sum 
With all of this being said, there is still no general consensus on if firms should even hedge.  
Morrell and Swan (2006) argue that a permanent hedging policy is not worth it for airlines. They are 
not opposed to short hedges if there is a risk of a natural disaster or a man made one. But with the 
exception of unforeseen circumstances, they do not believe that a firm should hedge. This is 
matched by different industry leaders who acknowledge that in the long run, hedging should not be 
expected to save money, but just smooth out cash flows. It is often said that hedging over a long 
period of time is not worth it because it is likely that the market will swing back the other direction 
but the firm will not be able to reap the benefits of that swing. Although he is writing about the use 
of derivatives at the time, Stulz (2004) argues that if investors wanted to have a firm hedge, then 
they, the investor, could do it themselves. He notes that any investor who would find a firm’s 
hedging practices that important would be able to make their own hedge in their portfolio.  
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2.10.5. Derivative Use  
This leads to the final problem of hedging: how it should be done.  There are many different 
options a firm has to reduce risk besides the use of financial instruments. One such way would be to 
build a plant in the same country as the product is being sold. By doing this, many Japanese auto 
manufacturers have been able reduce exposure between the US dollar (USD) and the Japanese Yen 
(JPY). Other firms have used backwards and forwards integration to cover risk exposure. However, 
for many industries, such as airlines, that is not a practical solution. This has led to the use of 
derivatives and other financial instruments to hedge risk. Looking at past examples Copeland and 
Joshi (1996) find that foreign currency hedging with derivatives did not reduce cash flow volatility. 
They go on to add that in general, derivatives are inefficient in managing foreign exchange risk. This 
information goes along well with the anecdotal evidence of hedging where it seems that a successful 
hedge year is often followed by an unsuccessful one.  However, Lee (2012) found the opposite to be 
true. He found that on average futures were an efferent means of hedging and became even more 
efficient as the duration of the contract increased. Stulz (2006) argues that derivatives only make 
hedging easier, so they do not create any more of a problem. He argues that if firms desired to, they 
could recreate the derivatives hedges with elaborate portfolios. This means that the use of 
derivatives is actually helpful as it is more efficient and convenient 
2.11. Fuel Hedging and the Airline Industry 
Different airlines utilize different hedging strategies based upon their respective risk 
aversion. All strategies must meet a certain requirement to be considered hedging. This requirement 
is determined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), whose standards are then used 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The rule for hedge accounting is FAS 133 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. To meet the FAS 133 requirements and be 
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considered for hedging accounting, the instrument must be highly correlated and efficient at 
offsetting changes in fair value or cash flows. While the rule does not make any numeric definition, 
the rule-of-thumb is that the hedge ratio should be between 80% and 125% (CME Group, 2012). 
FAS 133 also requires a firm to declare any derivatives held and value them at the price they are 
worth at the time of declaration. This process is called “mark-to-market.” By requiring firms to 
mark-to-market, the FASB prevents firms from inflating (deflating) losses (profits). Because of these 
requirements, as well as others that define hedging accounting, not every airline implements it. The 
choice to implement hedging accounting affects the cash flows of the firm. By implementing 
hedging accounting, a firm may post losses and gains from hedging along with the corresponding 
asset and cash flow. By not implementing hedging accounting, a firm has more control over what it 
deems as a suitable hedging instrument; however it faces different tax and SEC regulations as the 
income is considered earnings. The benefit of hedge accounting is that firms can post losses or gains 
from the hedge along with the losses or gains from the hedged asset. For airlines this would mean 
that they could match their hedging activities with their fuel expenditures. If they do not qualify or 
use hedge accounting, the gains and losses from a hedge are declared as income. 
Another aspect of hedging is risk aversion (Lien and Wang, 2001). Risk aversion is a measure 
of how exposed the airline wishes to be to price swings. Different airlines have different levels of 
risk aversion, which are evident in their different amounts of expenditure hedged as well as their 
hedging strategies. Republic Airways Holdings, the parent firm of Frontier Airlines, uses forwards to 
hedge 100% their jet fuel exposure (Republic Airways Holdings, 2013). By doing this the airline 
entirely remove their exposure to fluctuations in the price of jet fuel. This strategy is the most risk 
adverse strategy because by using forwards rather than futures, the airline has also removed any basis 
risk. Another risk adverse airline is Southwest Airlines. For the year of 2013, it had 51% of its fuel 
use hedged and currently has hedged 43% of the expected 2014 fuel use (Southwest, 2014). Unlike 
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Frontier, Southwest uses forwards to reduce jet fuel exposure. By using forwards, Southwest has 
increase liquidity compared to Frontier and is able to use hedging accounting2. However, Southwest 
is exposed to basis risk as well as the risk of losing hedging accounting. Recently, one of the 
instruments Southwest uses to hedge, WTI, has not been as highly correlated with jet fuel and it 
runs the risk of failing to meet the correlation requirement of FAS 133 (Southwest, 2014).  
Other airlines are not as risk averse as Frontier or Southwest. For example, US Airways and 
Allegiant Air currently operate without any hedge. US Airways hedged in the past but switched to 
being entirely exposed to the swings in jet fuel price. After a series of losses from a hedging 
program, the airline decided to go unhedged because they felt that hedging does not guarantee any 
protection (US Airways, 2014). The airline also mentioned the potential implications of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) decisions. This act and the CFTC oversee and set requirements on the use of 
financial derivatives. US Airways is exempt from some of the regulations because they are a non-
financial firm, but they worry that their counterparties will be subject to the reforms and could pass 
on costs (US Airways, 2014). Also mentioning the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 and the CTFC is Allegiant Air. For similar reasons as US Airways, Allegiant 
Air remains unhedged despite having 48.7% of their operating costs being jet fuel (Allegiant Travel 
Company, 2013).  
The airlines that decide to hedge also have to determine how much of the fuel use they will 
hedge and how far out into the future they will hedge. There are many determinants of these choices 
including risk aversion and financial liquidity. US Airways does not hedge for the reasons already 
mentioned, but also because they are worried about other risks that stem from being too illiquid (US 
                                                          
2 Forwards require fulfillment of a contract, and because they are not traded publicly, require more liquidity than other 
types of contracts. However, forwards are directly linked to the price of jet fuel, meaning that they are correlated enough 
to be considered for hedge accounting.  
 36 
 
Airways, 2014). Other airlines such as Alaska Airlines feel that the illiquidity is acceptable. 
Traditionally, Alaska Airlines hedged out 3 years, but recently has reduced the time frame to 12 
months. Also, in the past the airline had 50% of jet fuel use hedged 1 year out but this has been 
reduced to 6 months (Alaska Air Group, 2014). Southwest Airlines hedged a similar amount of their 
fuel consumption, at 51% in 2013 and 43% for 2014. Southwest has contracts in place for the next 
four years, however they do not mention illiquidity as a potential source of risk for the business 
(Southwest, 2014). American Airlines hedged 21% of its 2013 fuel requirements and 19% of its 
estimated 2014 requirements. However, American Airlines announced that once it has merged with 
US Airways, it will cease hedging and allow currently held contracts to reach maturity (American 
Airlines, 2014). Finally, Frontier has 100% for the next year and has less liquidity than other airlines, 
due to the use of forwards. Because forwards are two party contracts, and are not publicly traded, it 
is harder to liquidate a forward, whereas the other airlines that use futures still have the ability to 
liquidate their holdings.  
Hedging strategies also differ between airlines. Southwest uses a selection of different 
contracts (i.e. options and fixed price swaps) for multiple underlying assets (WTI, Brent, heating oil 
and unleaded gasoline) (Southwest, 2014). American Airlines would use crude and refined oils in its 
hedge of jet fuel, mainly using collars so that the airline could have an approximate guess as to how 
much it would spend on fuel for the year (American Airlines, 2014). Alaska Airlines uses similar 
practices to the other airlines, but also focus on commodity swaps more than the other airlines 
(Alaska Air Group, 2014). The benefit of a commodity swap for the airline is that it has no 
premium, while the deterring factor is that it affects future cash outlays by locking the airline into a 
set price. As mentioned earlier, Frontier (subsidiary of Republic) enters into a forward contract so 
that it has its entire price risk removed (Republic Airways Holdings, 2013). Many of the airlines 
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mention that an updated, fuel efficient fleet is part of the strategy against increases in fuel prices 
(Alaska Air Group, 2014; Southwest, 2014).  
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Table 2.1. Airlines’ Hedging Practices 
Airlines Time Period 
Covered 
Hedged Every Year? Other Remarks 
American Airlines 2000-2012 Yes  
Continental Airlines 2000-2009 No Acquired by United in 2010. 
Delta Airlines  2000-2007 No Acquired Northwest in 2008.   
Delta Airlines (Post Merger 
with Northwest) 
2008-2012 Yes Combined reporting after October 29, 2008. 
Northwest Airlines 2000-2008 No Acquired by Delta in 2008. 
United Airlines  2000-2009 No Acquired Continental in 2010. 
United Continental 2010-2012 Yes Combined reporting after October 2010. 
US Airways  2000-2004 No Acquired by America West in 2005 
US Airways (America West 
Post Merger) 
2006-2012 No America West-US Airways combined 
reporting began in 2006.  
America West 2000-2005 Yes Acquired US Airways in 2005. 
Southwest Airlines 2000-2010 Yes Acquired Air Tran in 2010. 
Southwest Airlines 
(Post Merger) 
2011-2012 Yes Combined reporting after May 2, 2011. 
JetBlue  2000-2012 Yes, except 20001  
AirTran 2000-2010 Yes  
Frontier Airlines 2000-2008 No Acquired by Republic in 2009. 
Allegiant 2005-2012 No  
Alaska Air 2000-2012 Yes  
Hawaiian Airlines 2000-2012 Yes  
Great Lakes Airlines 2000-2012 No  
Republic Airways  2004-2008 No Acquired Frontier. Combined reporting 
after October 1, 2009. 
Republic Airways (Post 
Merger) 
2009-2012 Yes  
Skywest Airlines 2000-2012 No  
Spirit Airlines 2010-2012 Yes  
Notes: 1 Fuel hedging implementation began in 2001 
Source: Lim and Hong (2014)  
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In addition to a fuel efficient fleet and the use of contracts, Delta Air Lines recently vertically 
integrated in an attempt to hedge jet fuel price exposure. The 2012 purchase of the Trainer refinery 
gives many benefits to Delta. First, it will help to protect against swings in all petroleum commodity 
prices. Delta has contracts in place to exchange the non-jet fuel distillates and products to BP and 
Phillips 66 for jet fuel (Delta Air Lines, 2013). Additionally, the purchase of the refinery included the 
assets needed to use the jet fuel refined at Trainer to supply Delta’s operations in Northeastern US, 
including LaGuardia and John F. Kennedy International Airport (Delta Air Lines, 2013). However, 
the purchase of the refinery exposes the airline to the additional risks that arise from operating a 
refinery.  
Different hedging strategies (including unhedged) have led to airlines paying different prices 
for jet fuel. Table 2.2 shows the average prices paid for fuel by airlines.  
Table 2.2. Average Price per gallon of Jet Fuel 
Average Price per Gallon of Jet Fuel (including hedge effects) 
Year American Airlines 
Delta Air 
Lines 
US 
Airways 
United 
Airlines Southwest Airlines Alaska Airlines 
Allegiant 
Air 
2013 3.09 3.00 3.04 3.13 3.16 3.30 3.20 
2012 3.20 3.25 3.17 3.27 3.30 3.37 3.18 
2011 3.01 3.06 3.11 3.06 3.19 3.18 3.07 
2010 2.31 2.33 2.24 2.35 2.50 2.37 2.30 
2009 2.01 2.15 1.74 1.75 2.12 2.05 1.76 
2008 3.03 2.33 3.17 3.54 2.44 2.52 2.98 
2007 2.12 2.21 2.20 2.19 1.80 2.48 2.30 
2006 2.01 2.10 2.08 2.13 1.64 1.98 2.12 
2005 1.74 1.79 1.77 1.79 1.13 1.53 1.87 
2004 1.22 1.16 1.13 1.25 0.92 1.40 1.41 
2003 0.88 0.82 0.89 0.94 0.80 0.95 1.12 
2002 0.76 0.67 0.75 0.78 0.68 0.88 1.05 
2001 0.81 0.69 0.80 0.87 0.71 0.77 
 2000 0.72 0.67 0.89 0.81 0.79 1.18 
 1999 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.80 
 1998 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.53 
 1997 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.72 
 1996 0.63 0.59 0.64 0.72 0.65 0.81 
 1995 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.60 0.55 0.70 
 1994 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.54 0.60 
 Source: 10-K filings 
 40 
 
Over the years covered by this study, fuel costs have grown as a percentage of total expense. 
Table 2.2 shows that even though fuel cost varies for each airline, it is increasing for the industry, 
and as shown in table 2.3 is the largest single cost for most airlines. 
Table 2.3. Fuel Cost as a Percentage of Operating Expense 
Fuel Cost as a Percentage of Operating Expense 
Year 
American 
Airlines 
Delta Air 
Lines 
US 
Airways 
United 
Airlines 
Southwest 
Airlines 
Alaska 
Airlines 
Allegiant 
Air 
2013 35 33 34 34 35 34 39 
2012 35 36 36 37 37 35 42 
2011 33 36 36 36 38 34 42 
2010 26 30 29 31 33 27 37 
2009 24 29 24 27 30 21 44 
2008 32 38 33 39 35 36 46 
2007 27 26 31 26 30 27 42 
2006 30 25 30 26 28 26 42 
2005 27 23 29 23 21 20 42 
2004 21 16 15 17 18 19 33 
2003 15 13 12 15 17 15 25 
2002 12 13 9 12 15 13 20 
2001 14 12 12 13 16 14 
 
2000 14 12 14 14 17 17 
 
1999 11 11 9 9 13 13 
 
1998 11 12 8 11 11 11 
 
1997 13 14 11 13 15 15 
 
1996 14 13 11 14 16 16 
 
1995 11 12 9 12 14 14 
 
1994 12 12 9 12 14 12 
 Source: 10-K filings 
2.12. Producer Hedging 
Risk management practices, such as hedging, differ when the costs of the input prices are 
highly correlated with the output prices (Wilson et al, 2007). The theory is that airlines, like other 
producers, are able to pass on costs from inputs on to consumers of the output. Airline ticket prices 
are highly correlated with the increase in jet fuel, meaning that changes in the input (jet fuel) price 
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will be reflected as changes in the output (ticket) price. However, there is a lag between the changes 
in fuel cost and the change in ticket price. This lag has an effect of reducing the correlation and 
means that producers (airlines) should hold hedges for the duration of the lag (Jackson, 1980; 
Wilson et al, 2007). Firms in this position are should also hedge based on what the competition is 
doing (Wilson et al, 2007; Hull, 2008).  Meaning that either the entire industry should hedge or none 
of the firms should.  
For the time period discussed in this study, jet fuel prices and ticket prices are highly 
correlated, over 90%. Using a Granger Causality test, the null that jet fuel does not cause ticket 
prices is rejected, while the reversed null that airfare does not cause jet fuel price cannot be rejected 
with confidence.3 
Figure 2.2. Airfare Index and Jet Fuel Price 
Source: EIA and St. Louis Fed Airfare CPI 
 
                                                          
3
 Results are in the Appendix 
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While there are periods in which airlines seemed unable to pass along the changes in cost of 
jet fuel on to ticket prices, over time, the airline industry as a whole generally has been able to have 
the consumer charged for the cost with a lag. However, the operating profit and expenses for 
airlines suggest a different relationship between fuel costs and revenue. Airlines measure production 
in available seat miles (ASM) which is a measure of the number of seats per mile. This is obtained by 
multiplying the number of seats in the aircraft by the number of miles flown, so an aircraft with 100 
possible seats on a 1,000 mile route would have 100,000 ASM. Airlines use this measure as a per unit 
cost and revenue source, meaning that while it is important to know how much each specific flight 
earns, it is more important to know what the revenue was for the total number of seats per mile. 
The difference in revenue with the cost of fuel and without the cost of fuel show that over time, 
increased revenue has not matched times of increased fuel costs. After the year 2007, operating 
profit ceased having a constant relationship with fuel costs. As you can see in Figure 2.3 in more 
recent years airlines have not been able to pass on fuel costs entirely. 
Figure 2.3. Operating Profit per Available Seat Mile 
Source: Bloomberg 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1. Models 
Let St represent the log spot price of jet fuel at time t and Ft represent the log price of a 
petroleum commodity futures. Assuming that the variance-covariance matrix of the returns,   , to a 
portfolio is constant over time. We write 
             (3.1) 
where β is the time invariant ratio of the number of futures contracts needed to hedge jet fuel and is 
independent of contract size;     represents the change in spot price, known as the first difference, 
at time t;     represents the first difference of the futures price.  The variance of    is  
   
    
      
         (3.2) 
where    
  denotes the variance of the portfolio   ;   
  denotes the variance of the change in spot 
price,    ;   
  denotes the variance of the change in futures prices,    ; and     denotes the 
covariance of     and    .  The minimum variance of    is obtained by taking the first derivative of 
equation (3.2) and setting it equal to 0: 
    
 
  
     
          
(3.3) 
The terms in equation (3.3) can be rearranged such that 
   
   
  
   
(3.4) 
The parameter   in equation (3.4) is the optimal hedge ratio. It is optimal because it minimizes the 
variance of the returns (risk) to the portfolio,   . The optimal hedge ratio can be determined by 
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many different methods, such as a linear regression estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Because    is time invariant, it does not respond to news about the fuel market or the economy.  
The correlation coefficient of     and    is 
  
   
    
  (3.5) 
 
and is assumed to be time-invariant. The optimal hedge ratio in equation (3.4) is equivalent to  
    
   
   
  (3.6) 
This study considers the    estimated from different econometric models to determine which    ̂ is 
closest to the true   . 
3.1.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
The relationship between    and    can be modeled as: 
             (3.7) 
where    is assumed to be homoskedastic, serially uncorrelated, and independently and identically 
distributed over time. However, these assumptions do not hold for The OLS model mentioned in 
equation (3.7) is insufficient and inappropriate for the data in this study, as the data in this study is 
non-stationary in levels. This can be remedied by the taking the first difference of the log prices, as 
will be described in greater detail further, creating equation (3.8). 
                (3.8) 
Because the OLS model minimized the sum of the squared residuals, ∑  
 , the β in (3.8) 
represents the variance minimizing hedge ratio; that is,  ̂ minimizes the volatility of the portfolio 
returns (Ederington, 1979). However, the equation is insufficient for the data of this study due to 
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the complexities of time series data the OLS method is often not appropriate (Brooks, 2004). When 
   (  |        is not constant, the error term for the series can be serially correlated through 
time.  
3.1.2. Error Correction Model  
Because an OLS model is insufficient for this study, an error correction model (ECM) is 
included. The ECM can be used when there is a long term cointegration factor for both of the 
series.  The ECM improves upon the OLS correcting for the cointegration relationship between the 
two series.  
               (                (3.9) 
 
where (            is a cointegration term and   represents the cointegration coefficient. For 
this study the cointegration term will be written as     , as it is the error term from equation (3.7). 
                    ∑       
 
   
 ∑       
 
   
     
(3.10) 
Under this model, the statistical tests are valid. This model can be used to model long run 
cointegration while still accounting for temporary deviations from that trend. For that reason, the 
cointegration term is lagged. The cointegration term represents the response to disequilibrium in the 
prior period (Brooks, 2004). More plainly, the model can only correct for the deviation once the 
deviation has happened, meaning that it must have occurred in a prior time period;    should be 
interpreted as the speed of adjustment back to the long run cointegration and measures the amount 
of correction made (Brooks, 2004).  
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The improvements of equation (3.10) over (3.9) include the addition of autoregressive terms 
for the two variables. Also, the inclusion of the first difference of the log prices will transform the 
data to a stationary process.  
3.1.3. Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic Model 
For many of these models, there still exists heteroskedasticity in the error term. To account 
for this, the autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) model is used.  
             ∑       
 
   
 ∑       
 
   
     
(3.11) 
                       (       
  
           
    
The heteroskedasticity in the error term means that the standard errors are likely to be 
incorrect, but even more importantly, ARCH models can account for volatility clusters (Brooks, 
2004). Volatility in the prices of financial assets are likely to be found in clusters, caused by some 
exogenous event, meaning that if the prices had a high volatility the day before they are likely to 
have a high volatility the next day. Accounting for the conditional volatility gives more efficient 
estimate of the hedge ratio. One of the assumptions for an OLS is homoskedasticity or that 
 (     , thus 
  
     (  |              [  
 |           ]  
(
(3.12) 
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However, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, equation (14) is no longer true, so an ARCH 
term can be added. An ARCH term allows for a conditional variance in the error term.  
  
           
        
          
   
(
(3.13) 
 
3.1.4. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model  
Another model used in this study is an improved ARCH model called generalized 
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) model. The GARCH model is more efficient 
and avoids over fitting the data (Brooks, 2004). 
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A GARCH model adds that the volatility is depended upon a constant, the variance of the 
error term from the previous period, like an ARCH model, but the GARCH adds that the current 
conditional variance is dependent upon the variance of the period prior. 
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(3.15) 
 
where ∑       
  
    would be referred to as the ARCH term and ∑       
  
    is the GARCH term. 
The generalized form in equation (3.15) is of order GARCH(q,p). These ARCH and GARCH 
models overcome the problems of OLS (Engle, 2001) and are solved with the maximum likelihood 
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procedure. The GARCH model that will be used in this study is of order GARCH(1,1), meaning 
that there will be one ARCH term and one GARCH term. 
 
 
3.1.5. Error Correction Model with GARCH Term 
The final econometric model used will be a combination of the ECM and the GARCH 
model (Adams and Gerner, 2012). 
The ECM with GARCH model adds the benefits of accounting for conditional variance to 
the improved error corrected model.  Because of the benefits of the ECM-GARCH, it is predicted 
that the hedge ratio from this model will be the most accurate hedge ratio from all of the 
econometric models.  
3.2. Measuring Hedge Effectiveness 
 The measure of hedge efficiency for previous papers has often been left out. Traditionally 
the hedge effectiveness for an OLS model has been the R2. However, with the increase in the terms 
and the complexity of the models, the use of measuring hedge effectiveness with R2 no longer seems 
proper. Some studies have used adjusted R2 to determine which hedge ratio is a better estimate 
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(Ghosh, 1996), others have used the log likelihood measure (Adams and Gerner, 2012) to determine 
which model and therefore hedge ratio is superior. Due to the worry of the R2 or log likelihood 
misrepresenting the effectiveness of the hedge, this study computes a hedge effectiveness for each 
model. The R2 can be computed separately for the models based on a “R2 Analogue” (Juhl et al, 
2011): 
             
    
    
  
(3.17) 
 Unlike the R2 that will be generated by the econometric programs, where SSE* is the total variation 
in the time series (         , where β is the hedge ratio determines by the model. The SST is the 
total variation in the time series for (     about its mean. This measure would allow the comparison 
across models in a more accurate measure of hedge effectiveness than the previous studies. 
3.3. Monte Carlo Simulation 
The goal of a hedge is risk reduction. While this study has generated many different hedge 
ratios and potential portfolios that an airline could use to hedge, these ratios should be tested to 
ensure accuracy. Other studies have used back testing and forecasting to test proposed hedge ratios 
(Adams and Gerner, 2012). However, for many activities, especially VaR, simulations are the 
preferred method (Wilson et al, 2007). Thus, a Monte Carlo simulation will be run generating many 
different outcomes. These outcomes will be random draws from a distribution that is matched to 
the data. The distributions will further have a covariance matrix meaning that the outcomes from the 
random draw should recreate possible occurrences.  The hedge effectiveness of the estimated hedge 
ratios will be tested against the simulated data. The simulated data provides an image of how the 
hedge ratios would fare in a realistic scenario, which is outside the data sample. 
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3.3.1. Optimization by Software 
The final method of estimating a hedge ratio was an optimization run by the program 
@Risk. This optimization maximized the hedge effectiveness based on the hedge ratio. Over 
thousands of trials, the software determined the maximum effectiveness of the hedge and reported 
the ratio that could achieve the maximum effectiveness for the data. This was done by using the 
measure of hedge efficiency in (3.18), or: 
              
∑[(         
 ]
∑[(       ̅̅ ̅̅̅  ]
  (3.18) 
where the program then maximized the value of the R2 analogue by changing the value  , thus 
optimizing hedge effectiveness.  
3.4. Value at Risk with Monte Carlo Simulation 
A Monte Carlo simulation is not only ideal for testing the hedge ratios and to determine 
effectiveness, it also has the ability to determine value at risk. As mentioned earlier, a Monte Carlo 
simulation is the preferred method of calculating VaR. For this method, the rate of return for the 
prices will be taken. Then, these rates will be fitted to a distribution that will have a covariance 
matrix tying all of the prices together. This prevents a random draw from the far left tail of one 
happening at the same time as a random draw from the far fight tail of the other. Along with a VaR 
by asset, a sensitivity analysis will be done to determine the optimal percentage of fuel use to hedge. 
 For the VaR, distributions were fitted to the data. Then, multiple portfolios were created for 
a fictional airline which needs jet fuel and owns contracts in petroleum products. These portfolios 
were designed to have different percentages of fuel use hedged as well as using the different assets as 
cross-hedging commodities. The amount of fuel that the airline used was taken from Southwest 
Airlines (Southwest, 2014) and then scaled down to a daily usage. The hedge ratio was then 
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multiplied by the amount of fuel hedged which was then divided by the unit of the contract, to 
determine how many contracts were needed to cross hedge.4  
The equation for the portfolios was           where    and    are selected from a 
fitted distribution, such as a Laplace or logistic. The values for    would be drawn from 
      (      where   represents shape and   location (mean). While the values for    would be 
drawn from         (      where   represents scale and   location (mean). For each random 
draw of    and   ,   will have a different value. These values then form a distribution themselves, 
such as    (      5 where    is the scale and   is the location (mean). This process will be done 
5000 times (iterations) to be sure that there are enough observations to create a well formed 
distribution.  From this distribution, the value of the 5% level on the left tail represents the VaR at 
5%, meaning that with 95% confidence, this value (loss) will not be exceeded. For example, the 
portfolio represents the cost for fuel paid by an airline, thus the VaR should be interpreted as the 
amount which 95% of the time, their daily fuel costs with hedge will not exceed.  
3.5. Data 
Jet fuel (technically jet kerosene) makes up around 9.7% of what is refined from a barrel of 
crude oil. The breakdown of crude oil between 1993 and 2013 is around 46% to motor gasoline 
(including diesel), 25% to distillate fuel oil (including No. 2 heating oil), 9.7% to jet kerosene, 4% to 
liquid petroleum gases, 5% to coke,  4% to residual fuel oil, with the remaining 6% to different types 
of naphtha, lubricants, waxes, and asphalt.6 During the period 1993-2013, the percentage of crude oil 
dedicated to jet kerosene has been kept between the low and high extremes of 8.5% in September 
1993 and 11.4% in January 1996, with an average of 9.7% over the 20 year span. The implication of 
                                                          
4
 As gasoil is sold by metric tonne conversion was used based on conversion sheet provided by the EIA 
5 For more on distributions that would result see (Nadarajah and Kotz, 2007). 
6 Based on Refinery Yield from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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that is that the supply relationship between crude and jet kerosene should remain the same, keeping 
the same long run relationship between petroleum products. If refiners decided to change the 
percentage of crude that would go to jet fuel, it could impact the hedging relationship as well. 
The potential cross hedging instruments considered are West Texas Intermediate- sweet 
crude (WTI) and its European crude oil counterpart North Sea Brent. There are also more refined 
oils that are publicly traded. These oils would be No. 2 heating oil, traded as New York Harbor 
ultra-low sulfur No. 2 diesel, formerly called heating oil, and gasoil, which is the same asset but 
traded in Europe. For example WTI, No. 2 heating oil, and natural gas are traded on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) while Brent and gasoil are traded on the Intercontinental Exchange 
(ICE).  The pricing information was retrieved from Bloomberg Professional service. The futures 
price data were obtained with 3, 6, 9, and 12 month rolling contracts for each commodity. The 
underlying physical asset for WTI is 1,000 barrels of sweet crude delivery at the hub in Cushing, 
Oklahoma. The underlying physical asset for Brent is 1,000 barrels delivered at the Sullom Voe. The 
underlying physical asset of heating oil is 1,000 barrels the delivery at the port of New York. The 
underlying physical asset for gasoil is a barge of 100 metric tonnes, delivered at the Antwerp, 
Rotterdam, and Amsterdam (ARA). 
 Finally, the jet fuel spot is the U.S. Gulf Coast 54 jet fuel spot price. This was chosen 
because it represents the most popular measure of jet fuel. Another benefit is that it is less volatile 
and lower priced than West Coast jet fuel (Alaska Air Group, 2014). The time span of the data is 
from April 1994 through February 2014.This time span includes a number of shocks and recessions, 
such as the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the SARS epidemic of 2003, and the recessions 
of 2001 and 2008. Shocks create extreme volatilities (large and unequal variances) which separate 
models will account for differently. This study will look at the use of different models in determining 
hedge ratios. 
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Table 3.1. Contract Descriptions  
Source: CME and NYMEX 
Asset Name Symbol Venue 
Contract 
Units 
Price 
Quotation 
Minimum 
Fluctuation 
Delivery  Description 
West Texas 
Intermediate 
Crude Oil 
CL NYMEX 
1,000 Barrels 
(42,000 
gallons) 
U.S. Dollars 
and Cents per 
barrel 
$0.01 per barrel 
Cushing, 
Oklahoma 
Also known as Texas 
light sweet, WTI is the 
most commonly traded 
commodity in the world. It 
is a sweet crude, 
containing .24% sulfur. 
New York 
Harbor 
Heating Oil 
HO NYMEX 
42,000 gallons 
(1,000 barrels) 
U.S. Dollars 
and Cents per 
Gallon 
$0.0001 per 
gallon 
New York, 
New York 
Heating oil, also known 
as No. 2 fuel oil, is a low 
viscosity distillate. As the 
name suggests, it is often 
used in residential and 
commercial heating. 
Brent Crude 
Oil 
CO ICE 
1,000 Barrels 
(42,000 
gallons) 
U.S. Dollars 
and Cents per 
barrel 
$0.01 per barrel 
Sullom 
Voe, 
Scotland 
Brent is a sweet crude 
from the North Sea. It is 
sourced from the Brent, 
Oseberg, Forties, and 
Ekofisk fields. 'Sweet' 
crude is defined as having 
a sulphur content of less 
than 0.5%. Brent 
contains about .37% 
sulfur. 
Gasoil QS ICE 
100 metric 
tonnes of 
gasoil 
U.S. Dollars 
and Cents per 
tonne 
$0.25 per tonne 
Any port 
within 
Antwerp, 
Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam 
area 
Gasoil is the same as No. 
2 fuel oil, but is the 
European designation for 
the product. 
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics Table 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic Distribution 
Jet Fuel Spot 146.76 104.30 417.88 24.15 98.34 0.63 2.03 519.2251 Exponential 
Brent 1-Month 51.87 33.46 146.08 9.64 35.85 0.66 2.02 560.9935 Exponential 
Brent 3-Month 51.84 32.69 147.05 10.16 35.87 0.63 1.97 548.2227 Exponential 
Brent 6-Month 51.68 31.51 148.13 10.92 35.95 0.60 1.91 542.483 Exponential 
Brent 9-Month 51.45 30.63 148.54 11.36 35.94 0.57 1.86 542.1659 Log Normal 
Brent 12-Month 51.19 29.71 148.21 11.70 35.87 0.56 1.82 544.5048 Log Normal 
WTI 1-Month 50.51 36.88 145.29 10.72 31.77 0.58 2.03 471.5232 Exponential 
WTI 3-Month 50.75 35.65 146.13 11.33 32.19 0.54 1.96 472.3479 Exponential 
WTI 6-Month 50.71 34.15 146.85 12.06 32.56 0.52 1.89 481.8863 Exponential 
WTI 9-Month 50.52 33.09 146.86 12.45 32.72 0.50 1.84 490.1864 Exponential 
WTI 12-Month 50.29 32.25 146.32 12.81 32.78 0.49 1.81 497.9488 Log Logistic 
Heating Oil 1-Month 145.05 101.70 410.60 29.52 96.95 0.64 2.04 531.0333 Exponential 
Heating Oil 3-Month 145.81 98.15 418.00 30.76 97.73 0.62 2.00 527.0762 Exponential 
Heating Oil 6-Month 146.12 91.19 426.70 33.16 98.61 0.61 1.98 525.0918 Exponential 
Heating Oil 9-Month 145.90 92.05 421.15 35.96 98.93 0.59 1.93 527.8644 Log Normal 
Heating Oil 12-Month 145.52 87.48 413.25 37.46 98.83 0.56 1.84 541.3268 Log Normal 
Gasoil 1-Month 451.79 313.75 1325.25 91.25 307.65 0.66 2.10 529.61 Exponential 
Gasoil 3-Month 451.90 297.25 1340.50 94.25 307.87 0.64 2.06 524.4263 Exponential 
Gasoil 6-Month 452.66 277.50 1353.25 101.75 309.10 0.62 2.02 518.553 Exponential 
Gasoil 9-Month 452.57 269.25 1341.75 109.00 309.97 0.59 1.96 519.0424 Log Normal 
Gasoil 11-Month 452.19 262.75 1332.25 112.50 310.16 0.58 1.91 523.5342 Log Normal 
Note: Distributions based on the Anderson-Darling test 
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3.5.1. Tests 
Due to the nature of time series, a number of tests should be run on the data before it is 
used in a model. These tests are used to establish if the data is stationary or non-stationary. A time 
series is stationary if its probability distribution does not change over time. If time series Yt has a 
joint distribution of (Ys+1, Ys+2, …, Ys+T) and it does not depend on s regardless of the value of T, 
then the data is stationary. If Yt does depend on s, the data is non-stationary (Stock and Watson, 
2012). This can be elaborated further as to having one constant mean, constant covariance and 
constant autocovariances for each lag (Brooks, 2002). Stationarity of a series is important for many 
reasons. Use of non-stationary data can lead to spurious regression, one which would appear as a fit 
model, but would actually be worthless (Brooks, 2002; Adams and Gerner, 2012). With a stationary 
series, shocks, or severe unexpected changes, will gradually have a smaller and smaller effect. 
However, with non-stationary data the persistence of shocks can be infinite, and a shock in one time 
period will continue to influence each and every time period without ever reducing in effect (Brooks, 
2002). The final problem with non-stationary data is that the distribution assumptions are no longer 
true, meaning that all t-statistics and f-statistics will be incorrect. This means that is there is no valid 
way to test a hypothesis with non-stationary data. In an attempt to model and work with non-
stationary data, a few models have been developed. With market data and other time series data that 
could be non-stationary, there could be the existence of a trend. A trend is a long term movement 
through the data which the values of the variable fluctuate around.  For example, the following chart 
of jet fuel spot prices would be an example of a linear trend line around which prices fluctuate. 
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Figure 3.1. Jet Fuel Spot Price with Trend 
 
Trends can be broken down further into two different categories. The first is a deterministic 
trend. A deterministic trend is a nonrandom function of time. This means that the increases in the 
price of jet fuel move around a certain linear increase over time. The other type of trend is a 
stochastic trend. A stochastic trend is one where the trend is random and varies over time. This is 
perhaps the more realistic of the two trends, as it can explain an increase for one section of time but 
also a decrease for a different section of time. A stochastic trend can be used to model data that may 
have periods of increase followed by periods of decrease. One example of a stochastic trend is a 
random walk. A random walk is where the value of the dependent variable in time T is dependent 
upon the value in the previous time period (T-1). This can be modeled as           . For a 
more improved model of a random walk, a drift term can be included such as    so the model 
becomes                . Trends are important for checking to see if the data is stationary or 
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non-stationary. If the series follows a random walk, then it is non-stationary. This is because the    
term, representing the errors of the equation, is conditionally distributed and depends on the time 
period and is serially uncorrelated. Because of these problems, tests should be done for stationarity 
of a series. 
3.5.1.1. Stationarity Tests 
The tests that have been run on this paper are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the 
Phillps-Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. The ADF and 
the PP tests check for a unit root in the series, while the KPSS checks for stationarity. While a single 
test could be used to determine stationarity, it is best to use a combination of a unit root test and a 
stationarity test. There are potential problems with just using a unit root test that could lead to 
increased type-II errors (Brooks, 2002). The ADF test checks for a unit root, and therefore 
stationarity in the series. It does this by checking for a stochastic trend, in this case called a unit root 
of 1, in the series. The null is that the series has a unit root (of 1); the alternative is that the series is 
stationary. Because this test depends on the number of lags included, a Schwartz Information 
Criterion (SIC) value is used to determine the optimal amount of lags. The next unit root test that 
was performed on the data was the PP test. The PP test is very similar to the ADF but it includes a 
measure to see if there is autocorrelation in the residuals. It shares the same null hypothesis as the 
ADF. The results for both the ADF and the PP tests were that the level data is non-stationary. Table 
3.3 shows that the ADF test results and 3.4 shows the PP test results. 
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Table 3.3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Results  
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
Null: Series has a Unit Root 
Significance : 10%= -3.12, 5%= -3.41, 1%= -3.96 
Level 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent -2.78997 -2.82727 -2.73825 -2.66415 -2.60289 
WTI -3.31185 -3.09819 -2.92883 -2.79475 -2.57627 
Heating Oil -2.96841 -2.78416 -2.64758 -2.57648 -2.54316 
Gasoil -2.60407 -2.52316 -2.42044 -2.35933 -2.32768 
First Log Difference 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent -73.2365 -73.8427 -74.8344 -76.2115 -77.0994 
WTI -52.4492 -71.5747 -73.6609 -75.0722 -76.1667 
Heating Oil -71.5908 -72.0581 -73.6955 -75.7795 -77.2332 
Gasoil -69.0067 -70.0595 -71.4536 -72.7268 -73.9508 
      
Table 3.4. Phillips-Perron Results 
Phillips-Perron Test 
Null: Series has a Unit Root 
Significance : 10%= -3.12, 5%= -3.41, 1%= -3.96 
Level 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent -2.7903 -2.73189 -2.69656 -2.63817 -2.59113 
WTI -3.16176 -3.03136 -2.85705 -2.74641 -2.6378 
Heating Oil -2.87464 -2.79985 -2.63242 -2.58461 -2.53211 
Gasoil -2.70111 -2.6929 -2.64638 -2.56616 -2.52623 
First Log Difference 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent -73.3249 -73.9124 -74.902 -76.3094 -77.298 
WTI -71.4042 -71.6707 -73.7584 -75.2065 -76.3613 
Heating Oil -71.9385 -72.1125 -73.7186 -75.8348 -77.5159 
Gasoil -68.9895 -70.0576 -71.459 -72.7441 -73.9821 
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Unit root tests have been criticized for failing to distinguish between non-stationary data and 
stationary data with unit roots close to 1 (Brooks, 2002). This is why the KPSS test was included. 
The KPSS is a test for stationarity, with the alternative hypothesis being non-stationarity. This 
means that a series with a unit root close to 1 would still be considered stationary. Due to the 
opposite nulls and alternative hypothesis, a series should be declared stationary by both types of 
tests to be sure of stationarity. The results for the KPSS test were rejection of the null for the level 
data, meaning non-stationarity, as seen in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5. Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin Results 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin  
Null: Series is Stationarity 
Significance : 10%=  0.119, 5%= 0.146, 1%= 0.216 
Level 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent 0.836192 0.84371 0.877039 0.899394 0.934429 
WTI 0.580759 0.636792 0.704538 0.756442 0.800508 
Heating Oil 0.717966 0.735573 0.77841 0.823428 0.897189 
Gasoil 0.699087 0.73166 0.763449 0.814673 0.851831 
First Log Difference 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Brent 0.037581 0.046689 0.060643 0.074785 0.089656 
WTI 0.031706 0.040247 0.054948 0.070314 0.087275 
Heating Oil 0.038673 0.047027 0.061569 0.079929 0.092502 
Gasoil 0.046151 0.055058 0.072852 0.089721 0.099646 
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If a time series follows a non-stationary process then the log first difference will be taken of 
the series. This transformation converts the level data, which is non-stationary, into a stationary 
series. This means that the tests for stationarity and unit root of 1 should be conducted on both level 
data and log difference data. This can be seen in Table 1, which shows that the log differenced data 
is stationary according to all three tests and the level price data is non-stationary in all of the tests.  
An earlier graph of level price data (Figure 3.1) shows an example of a linear trend and it also shows 
an example of non-stationarity. A graph of the same data after the transformation of the first log 
difference can be seen in Figure 3.2. Included in Figure 3.2 is a linear trend line to show that the 
data, once transformed, is stationary. The results for the log first difference of the data were 
rejection of the null for the ADF and PP tests and failure to reject the null for the KPSS meaning 
that the data is stationary.  
 Figure 3.2. Log Difference of Jet Fuel Price
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3.5.1.2. Cointegration Tests 
After determining the stationarity of the series, it has to be determined if the series are 
cointegrated with jet fuel. Cointegration means that two different series “move together” over time. 
This relationship exists as the two price series are related and have similar influences, meaning that 
though the prices (and therefore relationship) may vary in the short run, the series will return to 
being related in the long run. There are many tests for cointegration, including the Engle-Granger 
test and the Johansen cointegration test. The Engle-Granger test looks at the error term of an OLS 
between two time series, with the null that there is no cointegration. The combination of two non-
stationary variables would yield stationary error terms if the series were cointegrated. The test used 
to check for stationarity in the error term the ADF test is used.  The results for Engle-Granger test, 
shown in Table 3.6, were that the non-stationarity in the error terms was rejected, meaning that the 
spot price of jet fuel is cointegrated with the futures prices.  
 The Johansen cointegration test is specified in a vector autoregression (VAR) model. The 
model runs the two series to measure the number of cointegration relationships that may exist. 
Because the Johansen test does not have the ADF or a separate unit test, it is possible to include a 
constant and/or a trend. The results for the Johansen cointegration test were the same as the Engle-
Granger test. The null hypothesis of zero cointegration terms was rejected with a failure to reject the 
second null of at most one cointegration term; this can be seen in Table 3.6. The Johansen test was 
run with the inclusion of both a constant and a trend, based upon SIC values for the potential 
models.    
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Table 3.6. Cointegration Test Results 
Johansen Cointegration Test  Engle-Granger 
 
Contract None  
At most 
1 
 
Contract 
Tau-
Statistic 
Brent 1-Month 93.79879 8.291175 
 
Brent 1-Month -9.065518 
Brent 3-Month 86.59311 7.002707 
 
Brent 3-Month -9.693689 
Brent 6-Month 60.64995 5.755637 
 
Brent 6-Month -7.241888 
Brent 9-Month 45.71152 5.030281 
 
Brent 9-Month -6.077096 
Brent 12-Month 38.77651 4.509726 
 
Brent 12-Month -5.441673 
WTI 1-Month 92.0087 9.15905 
 
WTI 1-Month -7.375705 
WTI 3-Month 71.66035 8.062919 
 
WTI 3-Month -8.149583 
WTI 6-Month 50.07577 6.237567 
 
WTI 6-Month -6.833997 
WTI 9-Month 38.20476 5.066876 
 
WTI 9-Month -5.893029 
WTI 12-Month 32.07936 4.266998 
 
WTI 12-Month -5.286977 
Heating Oil 1-Month 174.9687 8.868992 
 
Heating Oil 1-Month -12.93099 
Heating Oil 3-Month 109.5238 7.472865 
 
Heating Oil 3-Month -10.53726 
Heating Oil 6-Month 50.31963 6.208997 
 
Heating Oil 6-Month -6.432806 
Heating Oil 9-Month 41.10974 5.712081 
 
Heating Oil 9-Month -5.48416 
Heating Oil 12-Month 40.82031 5.103538 
 
Heating Oil 12-Month -5.119681 
Gasoil 1-Month 141.6637 7.478849 
 
Gasoil 1-Month -12.04221 
Gasoil 3-Month 90.75148 6.439682 
 
Gasoil 3-Month -9.276612 
Gasoil 6-Month 52.41219 5.395362 
 
Gasoil 6-Month -6.579423 
Gasoil 9-Month 43.68192 4.997079 
 
Gasoil 9-Month -5.568938 
Gasoil 11-Month 42.31945 4.775469 
 
Gasoil 11-Month -5.21672 
 Note: Bolded numbers are significant at the 1% level 
and lower according to MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis 
(1999) p-values. 
  Note: Bolded numbers are significant at 
the 1% level and lower according to 
MacKinnon (1996) p-values. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Hedge Ratio 
The econometric models estimated in this paper were OLS, ECM, ARCH(1), GARCH(1,1), 
and ECM-GARCH. Included with these was a hedge ratio generated by optimizing hedge 
effectiveness, and the traditional method of determining the hedge ratio using equation (3.4) which 
will now be referred to as the “covariance” method. These results are reported in Table 4.1.  
The results of the study determine the best asset for a jet fuel cross hedge and to conclude 
the best method of determining the hedge ratio. As discussed earlier, there are different ways of 
determining the best hedge. It was expected that the ECM-GARCH would have the most effective 
hedge as it removed the homoskedasticity in the errors. The ARCH LM test which is posted with 
the results has the null of no homoskedasticity, this means that when the null is rejected then there is 
homoskedasticity, however if the null cannot be rejected the errors are not serially correlated. Most 
often the GARCH(1,1) and the ECM-GARCH models did not have homoskedasticity, but that did 
not transfer over into the model having the most effective hedge ratio.  
The first results presented in Table 4.1 are the hedge ratios generated from the different 
models. These results show that the OLS estimate for the optimal hedge ratio is very similar to the 
optimization’s estimate of the ratio. This means that of all of the models the OLS estimated a hedge 
ratio that is closest to the hedge ratio generated by an optimization of hedge effectiveness. 
Consistent with the prior studies, the OLS has a lower hedge ratio than the ECM and the ECM-
GARCH, leading to the conclusion that the OLS underestimates the hedge ratio (Ghosh, 1996). As 
time till maturity increases so does the hedge ratio, matching similar studies (Ripple and Moosa, 
2007). 
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Table 4.1. Hedge Ratio 
WTI Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Brent Contract Maturity in Months 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.7270 0.9228 1.0277 1.0839 1.1199 
 
OLS 0.8074 0.9428 1.0359 1.0755 1.0949 
ECM 0.7349 0.9256 1.0288 1.0860 1.1240 
 
ECM 0.8100 0.9431 1.0372 1.0798 1.1016 
ARCH(1) 0.7852 0.9229 1.0250 1.0826 1.1207 
 
ARCH(1) 0.8380 0.9587 1.0515 1.0992 1.1187 
GARCH(1,1) 0.7728 0.9093 1.0013 1.0458 1.0736 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.8415 0.9425 1.0130 1.0488 1.0681 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.7746 0.9100 1.0016 1.0459 1.0733 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.8436 0.9435 1.0138 1.0494 1.0683 
Covariance  0.8946 1.0423 1.1096 1.1537 1.1885 
 
Covariance 1.0206 1.1010 1.1515 1.1801 1.2132 
Optimization 0.7271 0.9228 1.0277 1.0839 1.1199 
 
Optimization 0.8074 0.9428 1.0359 1.0754 1.0949 
             
Heating Oil Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Gasoil Contract Maturity in Months 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.8963 1.0408 1.1238 1.1922 1.2216 
 
OLS 0.6659 0.7894 0.8569 0.8973 0.9056 
ECM 0.9047 1.0429 1.1257 1.1979 1.2330 
 
ECM 0.7679 0.8947 0.9521 0.9815 0.9845 
ARCH(1) 0.9688 1.0437 1.1141 1.1808 1.2284 
 
ARCH(1) 0.7925 0.9438 0.9987 1.0213 1.0217 
GARCH(1,1) 0.9585 1.0103 1.0606 1.1087 1.1469 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.7937 0.8976 0.9343 0.9581 0.9576 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.9624 1.0127 1.0607 1.1084 1.1474 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.8062 0.9042 0.9373 0.9611 0.9605 
Covariance 0.9684 1.0504 1.0825 1.1222 1.1508 
 
Covariance 0.9047 1.0117 1.0467 1.0734 1.0835 
Optimization 0.8963 1.0408 1.1238 1.1921 1.2215 
 
Optimization 0.6660 0.7894 0.8570 0.8974 0.9057 
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4.2. Model Results 
While all of the results will be posted in the appendix, presented in the following section will 
be the results from all of the models for contracts with WTI as the underlying asset. The first table is 
the hedge ratio generated by the “covariance” method, equation (3.21). These results are how 
textbooks (Hull, 2008) determine the hedge ratio. However, due to the design of OLS, it is can also 
be used to determine the variance minimizing hedge ratio, as seen in Table 4.3 
Table 4.2. WTI Covariance Results 
Covariance  
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 
12-
Month 
Hedge Ratio 0.894632 1.042307 1.109551 1.1537 1.188468 
R-Squared  0.45625 0.513421 0.512523 0.506451 0.498395 
 
Table 4.3. WTI OLS Results 
OLS 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.727026 0.922761 1.027705 1.083942 1.119921 
 
(0.010819) (0.011916) (0.013631) (0.014988) (0.016159) 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.475353 0.546125 0.532828 0.512048 0.490771 
Log-Likelihood 12992.9 13353.99 13282.04 13173.59 13067.23 
ARCH-LM (5) 31.6613 28.82523 25.31712 24.00661 21.1315 
(Bolded means significance at 5% or below) 
The OLS model yields the variance minimizing hedge ratio as the coefficient on the term 
representing the change in log futures prices. However, the ARCH-LM test is rejected, meaning that 
there is heteroskedasticity in the errors. An OLS also does not account for the long run relationship 
between the series, so an ECM was used. The ECM results are posted in Table 4.4 
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Table 4.4. WTI ECM Results 
ECM 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.734887 0.92564 1.028823 1.085951 1.124014 
 
(0.01078) (0.011845) (0.013562) (0.014932) (0.016117) 
ΔFt-1 0.017025 0.015983 0.041837 0.066494 0.084701 
ΔFt-2 0.063161 0.066022 0.061419 0.063926 0.06227 
ΔFt-3 0.010044 0.014429 - - - 
ΔFt-4 0.041975 0.031843 - - - 
ΔSt-1 -0.01926 -0.01454 -0.00914 -0.00611 -0.0016 
ΔSt-2 -0.06657 -0.06855 -0.06217 -0.05902 -0.05418 
ΔSt-3 0.004907 -0.006 - - - 
ΔSt-4 -0.02327 -0.01512 - - - 
et-1 0.029877 0.026806 0.019471 0.014741 0.011719 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.484273 0.553161 0.538947 0.518255 0.497362 
Log-Likelihood 13028.05 13385.07 13311.42 13202.06 13096.31 
ARCH-LM (5) 654.7391 582.1442 575.4598 565.4451 567.1922 
(Bolded means significance at 5% or below) 
 
The Results from the ECM show a higher hedge ratio, as earlier mentioned, it has been said 
that OLS under estimated the hedge ratio. The lag length was chosen based on SIC values, for the 1-
Month and 3-Month contracts 4 lags were used, for the other maturities only 2 lags were used. While 
the adjusted R2 and the log-likelihood ratios are both higher than the OLS, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity is still shown by the ARCH-LM test. Due to that, the ARCH(1) model was run, 
and its results are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5. WTI ARCH(1) Results 
ARCH(1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.785211 0.92293 1.025006 1.082595 1.12072 
 
(0.005234) (0.007161) (0.008563) (0.00934) (0.009979) 
ΔFt-1 -0.01453 -0.00807 0.038353 0.06315 0.090892 
ΔFt-2 0.022729 0.038038 0.011408 0.018258 0.019244 
ΔSt-1 0.012045 0.01603 0.002025 0.004894 0.001853 
ΔSt-2 -0.03643 -0.04575 -0.0254 -0.02692 -0.02414 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.493823 0.465587 0.43854 0.432948 0.425977 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.472991 0.546908 0.533752 0.514128 0.493906 
Log-Likelihood 13602.53 13909.59 13816.93 13677.08 13536.75 
ARCH-LM (5) 44.2231 46.59432 54.69169 58.6381 64.45046 
(Bolded means significance at 5% or below) 
  
The results from the ARCH(1) show that the ARCH term is significant, and with this the 
ARCH-LM test has lower values. Although there is still heteroskedasticity in the model, the 
ARCH(1) and its ARCH term are closer to accounting for the heteroskedasticity than previous 
models. The number of lags, two, used for both the futures and the spot prices was chosen based on 
SIC values. As mentioned earlier, the model does not fully account for heteroskedasticity, so a 
GARCH(1,1) model was used and its results are posted in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6. WTI GARCH(1,1) Results 
GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.772771 0.909336 1.001273 1.045815 1.073586 
 
(0.006799) (0.008243) (0.009418) (0.009993) (0.010562) 
ΔFt-1 0.00517 -0.00507 0.017243 0.030208 0.035034 
ΔFt-2 0.018423 0.010919 0.009382 0.011021 0.013445 
ΔSt-1 0.000805 0.004674 0.005452 0.012519 0.021384 
ΔSt-2 -0.04216 -0.04563 -0.04562 -0.04486 -0.04374 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.116236 0.11517 0.11076 0.106773 0.104185 
GARCH 0.88356 0.884967 0.890158 0.894626 0.897583 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.473899 0.5463 0.533187 0.513024 0.49242 
Log-Likelihood 14067.54 14418.65 14341.25 14204.68 14072.88 
ARCH-LM (5) 8.129499 4.712533 7.086755 8.426825 10.39599 
(Bolded means significance at 5% or below) 
 
The results from the GARCH(1,1) show that the model has a high log-likelihood and also 
has removed the heteroskedasticity from the errors. The number of lags is two, based on SIC values, 
for both spot and futures lagged data. Both the ARCH and the GARCH term are significant and the 
ARCH-LM test for the first time cannot be rejected with 95% confidence or greater. The successes 
of the GARCH(1,1) suggested that an ARCH and a GARCH term were needed to account for the 
heteroskedasticity in the errors, but the model still does not account for the long run relationship. 
To accommodate both of these factors an ECM model with GARCH terms was run, and the results 
for the ECM-GARCH can be found in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7. WTI ECM-GARCH(1,1) Results 
ECM-GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.774559 0.909959 1.001557 1.045872 1.073283 
 
(0.006745) (0.008206) (0.009441) (0.010031) (0.010576) 
ΔFt-1 -0.00311 -0.01158 0.012603 0.026771 0.032197 
ΔFt-2 0.010549 0.005296 0.005595 0.00812 0.010901 
ΔSt-1 0.007782 0.010024 0.009697 0.01583 0.024205 
ΔSt-2 -0.03537 -0.04064 -0.0417 -0.04165 -0.04093 
et-1 -0.01425 -0.0115 -0.00868 -0.00687 -0.00566 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.116814 0.115621 0.111364 0.107089 0.104078 
GARCH 0.882275 0.88438 0.889477 0.894218 0.897611 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.479771 0.550248 0.536089 0.515367 0.494412 
Log-Likelihood 14085.6 14432.37 14351.04 14212.27 14079 
ARCH-LM (5) 7.850179 4.850799 7.248721 8.535928 10.40054 
(Bolded means significance at 5% or below) 
 
The results from the ECM-GARCH model are that the model has the highest log-likelihood 
value, there is no heteroskedasticity in the errors, and that the hedge ratio includes a long term 
relationship between the series. However, the actual effectiveness of the hedge ratio generated is not 
judged by any of the values presented in the table. This led to the use of a hedge effectiveness 
measure that will be mentioned in future sections.  
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4.3. Measure of Log-Likelihood 
While many of the models give similar ratios, they cannot all be the best estimate of the true 
optimal hedge ratio. Based upon the Adams and Gerner (2012) the log-likelihood can be used to 
measure how well the model explains the occurrences. The higher the log-likelihood the better the 
model. For Adams and Gerner (2012), they concluded that the better the model, the better the 
hedge ratio and the asset. While this study does not fundamentally agree with this, the log 
likelihoods of the models were used 
For every asset, the log-likelihood of the ECM-GARCH model was the highest. These 
values were taken for each asset and graphed to show, based upon log-likelihood, which asset should 
be used based on the contract length. The results in Figure 4.1 show that based upon log-likelihood 
the best asset to hedge jet fuel is heating oil and the shorter the contract duration the better. These 
results are similar with other studies that find shorter maturity contracts for refined products to be 
the best cross hedge.  
    
Figure 4.1. Log-Likelihood Results for ECM-GARCH Models 
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4.4. Measure of Hedge Effectiveness 
These results however, do not include the actual measure of hedge effectiveness. The 
argument that an OLS is insufficient is predicated by the assumption that an adjusted R2 (Ghosh, 
1996) or a log-likelihood (Adams and Gerner, 2012). These measures that have been used in other 
studies are measures of how well the model fits, not measures of the accuracy of the hedge ratio. For 
this, the model in equation (3.21) is used, the “R2 Analogue” (Juhl et al, 2011). This looks at the 
position of the hedged portfolio and divides it by the unhedged position, with all of that subtracting 
from 1. This means that the smaller the effect of the hedge, the larger the ratio, and therefore the 
lower the number after the ratio has been subtracted from one.  
The results of the test show that, as expected, the similar hedge ratios yield similar 
effectiveness values. Table 4.8 presents the results of the hedge effectiveness test, with the highest 
effectiveness value in bold. However, the optimal hedge ratio that preformed the best for the time 
period sampled was the OLS hedge ratio. Technically, the ratio generated by the software 
optimization was the most effective, but it was designed specifically for this data, so it was not 
considered. The OLS method generates the best estimate contrary to past studies. The past studies 
used measures that judged how well the model fit the data, while this study uses a proper measure of 
hedge effectiveness. 
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Table 4.8. Results of Hedge Effectiveness 
WTI Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Brent Contract Maturity in Months 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.475441 0.546214 0.532922 0.512146 0.490873 
 
OLS 0.49377 0.530689 0.516716 0.487935 0.461986 
ECM 0.475386 0.546209 0.532922 0.512144 0.490867 
 
ECM 0.493765 0.530689 0.516715 0.487927 0.461968 
ARCH(1) 0.472402 0.546214 0.532919 0.512145 0.490873 
 
ARCH(1) 0.493064 0.530538 0.516598 0.487695 0.461766 
GARCH(1,1) 0.473564 0.546098 0.53257 0.511513 0.490033 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.492889 0.530689 0.516464 0.487636 0.461709 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.473414 0.546108 0.532577 0.511515 0.490022 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.492778 0.530689 0.516483 0.48765 0.461714 
Covariance 0.450186 0.537048 0.529541 0.510023 0.489032 
 
Covariance 0.45934 0.515734 0.510276 0.483307 0.456587 
Optimization 0.475441 0.546214 0.532922 0.512146 0.490873 
 
Optimization 0.49377 0.530689 0.516716 0.487935 0.461986 
             
Heating Oil Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Gasoil Contract Maturity in Months 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
 
Model 1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.666851 0.665577 0.615343 0.588811 0.56933 
 
OLS 0.294521 0.330774 0.306812 0.28985 0.278142 
ECM 0.666793 0.665574 0.615342 0.588798 0.56928 
 
ECM 0.287616 0.324889 0.303035 0.287304 0.276034 
ARCH(1) 0.662495 0.665572 0.615298 0.588758 0.569312 
 
ARCH(1) 0.283883 0.318125 0.298426 0.284318 0.273579 
GARCH(1,1) 0.663646 0.665004 0.613398 0.585926 0.567205 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.283678 0.324565 0.304317 0.288522 0.277227 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.663228 0.665092 0.613407 0.585908 0.567236 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.281463 0.323776 0.304118 0.288388 0.277123 
Covariance 0.662539 0.66552 0.614513 0.586785 0.567424 
 
Covariance 0.256655 0.304541 0.291776 0.278695 0.26741 
Optimization 0.666851 0.665577 0.615343 0.588812 0.56933 
 
Optimization 0.294521 0.330774 0.306812 0.28985 0.278142 
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4.5. Monte Carlo Simulation 
The comparison made of the R2 analogue that is shown in Table 4.8 is that it is only for the 
time period and the data from which it was drawn. To have a more practical measure of which 
model creates a more accurate hedge ratio, the ratios that were developed here were tested against 
simulated data. Many other studies use back testing and forecasting to determine how well the hedge 
ratios generated would minimize variance. However, this study decided to use Monte Carlo 
simulations to forecast, to work outside the data. First, it was required that a potential 100 day 
period on which to test the hedge ratios estimated was created. The generated 100 day period was 
created from results drawn from a fitted distribution to the rates of change. The software used was 
@Risk., which is not only able to fit the distributions but is also able to generate a covariance matrix 
so that the random draws are correlated in an appropriate manner. The distributions that were fitted 
to the series based on AIC are presented in Table 4.9 (Palisade, 2014). 
 
Table 4.9. Monte Carlo Distributions 
Fitted Distribution Contract or Asset Fitted Distribution Contract or Asset 
Laplace Jet Fuel Logistic Heating Oil 1-Month 
Laplace WTI 1-Month Logistic Heating Oil 3-Month 
Logistic WTI 3-Month Logistic Heating Oil 6-Month 
Logistic WTI 6-Month Logistic Heating Oil 9-Month 
Logistic WTI 9-Month Logistic Heating Oil 12-Month 
Logistic WTI 12-Month Laplace Gasoil 1-Month 
Laplace Brent 1-Month Logistic Gasoil 3-Month 
Laplace Brent 3-Month Logistic Gasoil 6-Month 
Laplace Brent 6-Month Logistic Gasoil 9-Month 
Laplace Brent 9-Month Logistic Gasoil 11-Month 
Laplace Brent 12-Month 
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Table 4.10. Results of Monte Carlo Hedge Effectiveness 
WTI Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Brent Contract Maturity in Months 
  1 3 6 9 12 
 
  1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.524587 0.533679 0.57157 0.562763 0.52564 
 
OLS 0.486452 0.551762 0.461267 0.459526 0.446571 
ECM 0.525016 0.533624 0.571683 0.562952 0.526003 
 
ECM 0.486377 0.551776 0.461184 0.459605 0.446673 
ARCH(1) 0.525103 0.533676 0.571291 0.562635 0.525712 
 
ARCH(1) 0.484886 0.552276 0.460108 0.459783 0.446788 
GARCH(1,1) 0.525509 0.533793 0.568562 0.558582 0.520743 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.484609 0.551751 0.462532 0.458728 0.445839 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.525468 0.533792 0.568597 0.558589 0.520706 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.484436 0.551792 0.462493 0.458754 0.445849 
Covariance  0.509423 0.522403 0.576968 0.567465 0.530217 
 
Covariance 0.445142 0.543866 0.446985 0.457448 0.443669 
Optimization 0.524591 0.533678 0.57157 0.562762 0.525638 
 
Optimization 0.486451 0.551762 0.461271 0.459525 0.446569 
             
Heating Oil Contract Maturity in Months 
 
Gasoil Contract Maturity in Months 
  1 3 6 9 12 
 
  1 3 6 9 12 
OLS 0.699531 0.704488 0.635248 0.624217 0.589934 
 
OLS 0.259351 0.227745 0.217819 0.186618 0.190372 
ECM 0.700269 0.704674 0.63536 0.624424 0.59001 
 
ECM 0.246444 0.211382 0.205388 0.171864 0.180356 
ARCH(1) 0.702357 0.704742 0.634616 0.623726 0.589992 
 
ARCH(1) 0.241239 0.199999 0.196629 0.162945 0.174164 
GARCH(1,1) 0.702445 0.70116 0.629607 0.618163 0.586953 
 
GARCH(1,1) 0.240961 0.210784 0.208271 0.176514 0.18425 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.702431 0.701465 0.629622 0.618135 0.586991 
 
ECM-
GARCH(1,1) 0.237997 0.209359 0.207798 0.175942 0.183859 
Covariance 0.702363 0.705314 0.631966 0.619527 0.587218 
 
Covariance 0.207172 0.180297 0.185761 0.149422 0.161746 
Optimization 0.699533 0.704486 0.635244 0.624214 0.589933 
 
Optimization 0.259345 0.227736 0.21781 0.186606 0.190363 
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The results from the Monte Carlo simulation in Table 4.10 suggest that there is not one 
model that consistently estimates a more precise hedge ratio. In Table 4.8 and Table 4.10 the bolded 
values represent the highest and therefore the most effective hedge. While some models never 
generated the best hedge ratio, there were not any models that always generated the best hedge ratio 
for all assets. The exception is the OLS estimates from gasoil. For gasoil the OLS estimates for the 
hedge ratio were the optimal ratios for all contracts.  
Figure 4.2 shows the average effectiveness of all of the models for the four different 
commodities. This is a graphical representation showing which commodity hedge is the most 
efficient cross hedge, and which contract maturity should be used. As you can see on Figure 4.2, the 
best cross hedge commodity is heating oil for all maturities. Again, this is a logical conclusion as 
heating oil is a refined petroleum product and is therefore likely to be highly correlated with jet fuel, 
an even more refined petroleum product.  
 
Figure 4.2. Hedge Effectiveness by Commodity from the Simulated Results 
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Equally noticeable from Figure 4.2 is that gasoil is the least suitable cross-hedging asset. This 
could have in part to deal with the commodity contract being in a different unit of measure than the 
other contracts and also due to the minimum fluctuation being $0.25 per tonne, while the other 
commodities are $0.01 per barrel. Also important is that Brent and WTI were similar in 
effectiveness, but as maturity increased, WTI became the superior cross hedging asset. These results 
are similar with Adams and Gerner (2012), who found that past a six month maturity WTI was the 
best asset with which to hedge. However, based on the results shown in Figure 4.2, the best asset 
use in cross-hedging is heating oil. 
4.6. Value at Risk 
The final part of this study looks at the value at risk generated by jet fuel for an airline. This 
will look at the daily VaR, which is the most an airline could lose due to fuel in a day. Figure 4.3 
shows that the optimal strategy to reduce Value at Risk is to use heating oil contracts to hedge 50% 
of estimated daily fuel usage. It is assumed that because airlines have fixed costs and difficulty 
starting and stopping routes, they can fairly accurately estimate their own fuel usage.  
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Figure 4.3. VaR for Potential Hedge Percentages 7 
The Monte Carlo simulation for VaR is by creating different portfolios with payoffs that 
correspond to different hedging positions. First, Distributions are fitted to the rates of change, the 
software has the ability to do all of the series at once to create a covariance matrix, allowing for 
more realistic simulations. Then, to create a realistic daily amount of fuel usage, the average annual 
consumption of similarly sized airlines was determined and was divided by 365. That was a large 
value in terms of jet fuel, so in order to determined how many contracts were needed gallons were 
converted into barrels and barrels converted into contracts.  
Knowing how many contracts were needed based on estimated fuel consumption, portfolios 
could be designed representing the potential stances a hedger could have. The portfolios tested the 
amount hedged by the airline in 10% increments from 0, completely unhedged by futures, to 100, 
completely hedged fuel use by futures. The results for the 95% VaR are posted in Figure 4.3 and are 
given in normal dollar amounts. It is interpreted that with 95% confidence, the firm will pay no 
more than [X] amount for fuel. 
  
                                                          
7 Numeric results are presented in the Appendix, along with a 99% VaR 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Airlines have had mixed results with hedging and the general feeling from both scholars and 
airline managers themselves is that airlines are unsure of how to hedge their jet fuel exposure. This 
study has presented both the arguments for and against hedging. While the study did not intend to 
prove that airlines should hedge, it has shown that if an airline wishes to reduce its value at risk, a 
well-constructed hedge portfolio can significantly reduce VaR. Furthermore, if the airline wishes to 
construct a cross-hedging portfolio, the optimal hedge ratio generated from an OLS is not 
inappropriate. While some papers have suggested that due to the shortcomings of an OLS, a more 
advanced model should be used, this study does not reach the same conclusions. While other 
models, such as ECM and GARCH(1,1) generate similar hedge ratios to the OLS, after simulations 
the results were that no model clearly and consistently generates a better hedge ratio than the other 
models. This means that due to the ease of understanding the OLS and the R2 as a measure of 
efficacy, an OLS is still an appropriate model to use. 
Other findings of this study are that cross-hedges created with futures should use heating oil 
as the underlying commodity. As heating oil is a refined petroleum product, its price follows jet fuel 
closer than the other petroleum products. Moreover, the relationship between heating oil will likely 
stay the same while oil booms could affect the price of WTI and Brent (Southwest, 2014). While 
some airlines continue to use Brent and WTI crude oil contracts, the hedge portfolios with the 
lowest VaR and the highest effectiveness had heating oil as the underlying asset. 
This study also determined that for the data used, airlines would not qualify for hedge 
accounting if they used forwards. While heating oil contracts would decrease airlines’ fuel VaR, the 
contracts are not correlated enough to qualify for the benefit of hedge accounting. Airlines could 
 79 
 
overcome this hedge accounting problem by switching to a different type of contract, such as a 
forward, but they would then lose the benefits of using futures contracts. 
This study has provided many solutions to problems that exist in the airline industry, 
however there are still drawbacks. The main drawback of this study is that it used daily data, 
providing both a daily VaR and daily hedge ratio. To have a fuller solution to the questions of 
hedging and model usage, weekly or monthly data should be used providing respective VaR and 
hedge ratios. Also, the VaR calculated was for jet fuel use by an airline. It would be an interesting 
examination of an airline if a component VaR was used, including interest rate, foreign exchange, 
and equity risks along with commodity risk.  
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APPENDIX. MODEL ESTIMATIONS 
Table A.1. Results of the Airfare/Jet Fuel Granger Causality 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1994M04 2014M02 
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     JETFUELPRICE does not Granger Cause CPI_AIRFARE  237  12.2145 9.E-06 
 CPI_AIRFARE does not Granger Cause JETFUELPRICE  2.02397 0.1345 
    
    
Table A.2. Correlation Matrix for Airfare/Jet Fuel 
 
 
CPI Airfare Jet Fuel 
CPI Airfare 1 0.905128 
Jet Fuel 0.905128 1 
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Table A.3. WTI Test Results8 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Bolded numbers mean significance at 5% and below for all result tables 
WTI Covariance  
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Hedge Ratio 0.894632 1.042307 1.109551 1.1537 1.188468 
R-Squared  0.45625 0.513421 0.512523 0.506451 0.498395 
WTI OLS 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.727026 0.922761 1.027705 1.083942 1.119921 
 
(0.010819) (0.011916) (0.013631) (0.014988) (0.016159) 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.475353 0.546125 0.532828 0.512048 0.490771 
Log-Likelihood 12992.9 13353.99 13282.04 13173.59 13067.23 
ARCH-LM (5) 31.6613 28.82523 25.31712 24.00661 21.1315 
 
WTI ECM 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.734887 0.92564 1.028823 1.085951 1.124014 
 
(0.01078) (0.011845) (0.013562) (0.014932) (0.016117) 
ΔFt-1 0.017025 0.015983 0.041837 0.066494 0.084701 
ΔFt-2 0.063161 0.066022 0.061419 0.063926 0.06227 
ΔFt-3 0.010044 0.014429 - - - 
ΔFt-4 0.041975 0.031843 - - - 
ΔSt-1 -0.01926 -0.01454 -0.00914 -0.00611 -0.0016 
ΔSt-2 -0.06657 -0.06855 -0.06217 -0.05902 -0.05418 
ΔSt-3 0.004907 -0.006 - - - 
ΔSt-4 -0.02327 -0.01512 - - - 
et-1 0.029877 0.026806 0.019471 0.014741 0.011719 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.484273 0.553161 0.538947 0.518255 0.497362 
Log-Likelihood 13028.05 13385.07 13311.42 13202.06 13096.31 
ARCH-LM (5) 654.7391 582.1442 575.4598 565.4451 567.1922 
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Table A.3. WTI Test Results (continued) 
WTI ARCH(1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.785211 0.92293 1.025006 1.082595 1.12072 
 
(0.005234) (0.007161) (0.008563) (0.00934) (0.009979) 
ΔFt-1 -0.01453 -0.00807 0.038353 0.06315 0.090892 
ΔFt-2 0.022729 0.038038 0.011408 0.018258 0.019244 
ΔSt-1 0.012045 0.01603 0.002025 0.004894 0.001853 
ΔSt-2 -0.03643 -0.04575 -0.0254 -0.02692 -0.02414 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.493823 0.465587 0.43854 0.432948 0.425977 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.472991 0.546908 0.533752 0.514128 0.493906 
Log-Likelihood 13602.53 13909.59 13816.93 13677.08 13536.75 
ARCH-LM (5) 44.2231 46.59432 54.69169 58.6381 64.45046 
 
WTI GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.772771 0.909336 1.001273 1.045815 1.073586 
 
(0.006799) (0.008243) (0.009418) (0.009993) (0.010562) 
ΔFt-1 0.00517 -0.00507 0.017243 0.030208 0.035034 
ΔFt-2 0.018423 0.010919 0.009382 0.011021 0.013445 
ΔSt-1 0.000805 0.004674 0.005452 0.012519 0.021384 
ΔSt-2 -0.04216 -0.04563 -0.04562 -0.04486 -0.04374 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.116236 0.11517 0.11076 0.106773 0.104185 
GARCH 0.88356 0.884967 0.890158 0.894626 0.897583 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.473899 0.5463 0.533187 0.513024 0.49242 
Log-Likelihood 14067.54 14418.65 14341.25 14204.68 14072.88 
ARCH-LM (5) 8.129499 4.712533 7.086755 8.426825 10.39599 
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Table A.3. WTI Test Results (continued) 
WTI ECM-GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.774559 0.909959 1.001557 1.045872 1.073283 
 
(0.006745) (0.008206) (0.009441) (0.010031) (0.010576) 
ΔFt-1 -0.00311 -0.01158 0.012603 0.026771 0.032197 
ΔFt-2 0.010549 0.005296 0.005595 0.00812 0.010901 
ΔSt-1 0.007782 0.010024 0.009697 0.01583 0.024205 
ΔSt-2 -0.03537 -0.04064 -0.0417 -0.04165 -0.04093 
et-1 -0.01425 -0.0115 -0.00868 -0.00687 -0.00566 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.116814 0.115621 0.111364 0.107089 0.104078 
GARCH 0.882275 0.88438 0.889477 0.894218 0.897611 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.479771 0.550248 0.536089 0.515367 0.494412 
Log-Likelihood 14085.6 14432.37 14351.04 14212.27 14079 
ARCH-LM (5) 7.850179 4.850799 7.248721 8.535928 10.40054 
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Table A.4. Brent Results 
Brent Covariance 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Hedge Ratio 1.020602 1.101034 1.151488 1.180107 1.213179 
R-Squared  0.515376 0.541371 0.533657 0.517 0.509235 
      
      
Brent OLS 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.807396 0.942804 1.035912 1.075471 1.094932 
 
(0.011582) (0.012561) (0.014194) (0.015609) (0.01674) 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.493672 0.530595 0.516621 0.487836 0.461882 
Log-Likelihood 13081.46 13270.16 13197.05 13052.9 12929.72 
ARCH-LM (5) 615.1766 609.1136 598.0085 591.4396 572.5104 
      
      Brent ECM 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.809972 0.943125 1.03715 1.079769 1.101618 
 
(0.01148) (0.012485) (0.014134) (0.015552) (0.016702) 
ΔFt-1 0.039346 0.026278 0.040822 0.078718 0.087803 
ΔFt-2 0.061525 0.06633 0.082176 0.09751 0.099314 
ΔSt-1 -0.03437 -0.01903 -0.01259 -0.01607 -0.0094 
ΔSt-2 -0.06056 -0.05684 -0.06247 -0.0667 -0.06184 
et-1 -0.03358 -0.02872 -0.02035 -0.01564 -0.013 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.505189 0.539113 0.523715 0.495586 0.469529 
Log-Likelihood 13135.4 13312.32 13230.45 13087.52 12962.05 
ARCH-LM (5) 626.4285 610.4858 588.6348 581.5674 563.2034 
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Table A.4. Brent Results (continued) 
Brent ARCH(1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.837967 0.958736 1.05154 1.099233 1.118719 
 
(0.006886) (0.007193) (0.008823) (0.00963) (0.011016) 
ΔFt-1 0.070715 0.051675 0.034735 0.10329 0.113622 
ΔFt-2 0.043026 0.042103 0.044875 0.057477 0.056206 
ΔSt-1 -0.05166 -0.03513 -0.00122 -0.03126 -0.03491 
ΔSt-2 -0.04809 -0.04416 -0.0436 -0.04543 -0.05005 
      C 0.000157 0.000139 0.00015 0.000167 0.000189 
ARCH 0.548487 0.597036 0.559254 0.523995 0.460872 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.496365 0.532457 0.518385 0.491152 0.465409 
Log-Likelihood 13717.16 13957.14 13831.24 13620.96 13427.19 
ARCH-LM (5) 133.4095 153.7241 144.8967 91.40228 76.52871 
      
      Brent GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.841531 0.94254 1.012978 1.048781 1.068052 
 
(0.007528) (0.007835) (0.008591) (0.009217) (0.009734) 
ΔFt-1 0.060515 0.037615 0.035972 0.048928 0.049858 
ΔFt-2 0.046931 0.045038 0.04617 0.049607 0.057101 
ΔSt-1 -0.05131 -0.03225 -0.02044 -0.01773 -0.00928 
ΔSt-2 -0.05548 -0.05458 -0.05843 -0.05955 -0.0622 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.113761 0.133717 0.129694 0.119597 0.114029 
GARCH 0.892489 0.876318 0.878958 0.887757 0.893641 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.4964 0.532692 0.518369 0.490508 0.464794 
Log-Likelihood 14281.76 14625.75 14506.4 14324.23 14131.22 
ARCH-LM (5) 15.53628 9.231074 9.849777 11.46624 12.24918 
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Table A.4. Brent Results (continued) 
Brent ECM-GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.843623 0.943516 1.01384 1.049429 1.068313 
 
(0.007537) (0.007827) (0.008629) (0.009268) (0.009768) 
ΔFt-1 0.050446 0.031649 0.032687 0.046182 0.047337 
ΔFt-2 0.03915 0.040345 0.043423 0.047875 0.055742 
ΔSt-1 -0.04058 -0.02515 -0.01568 -0.01356 -0.00552 
ΔSt-2 -0.0459 -0.04789 -0.0536 -0.05569 -0.05909 
et-1 -0.02215 -0.0169 -0.01232 -0.00996 -0.00834 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.112064 0.13355 0.129948 0.120418 0.114548 
GARCH 0.894118 0.876687 0.878839 0.88703 0.893151 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.503041 0.537769 0.522251 0.493812 0.467741 
Log-Likelihood 14303.97 14642.58 14519.4 14335.69 14141.01 
ARCH-LM (5) 16.29733 9.555932 9.772597 11.15019 11.91678 
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Table A.5. Heating Oil Results 
 
 
     
 
 
Heating Oil Covariance  
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Hedge Ratio 0.968411 1.050415 1.082498 1.122214 1.150821 
R-Squared  0.660258 0.665778 0.625482 0.606737 0.596076 
      
Heating Oil OLS 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.896316 1.040844 1.123817 1.192209 1.22159 
 
(0.008976) (0.010453) (0.012588) (0.014115) (0.015052) 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.666786 0.66551 0.615268 0.588733 0.569251 
Log-Likelihood 14124.12 14114.59 13765.86 13599.65 13484.32 
ARCH-LM (5) 365.9266 630.8454 668.7453 602.2236 596.1056 
      
      Heating Oil ECM 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.904697 1.042901 1.125693 1.197936 1.232952 
 
(0.008833) (0.010336) (0.012503) (0.014042) (0.014971) 
ΔFt-1 0.071978 0.041295 0.028775 0.056384 0.090588 
ΔFt-2 0.028853 0.037135 0.065829 0.074055 0.084966 
ΔSt-1 -0.06053 -0.01986 0.011794 0.018683 0.016704 
ΔSt-2 -0.04731 -0.05247 -0.07114 -0.06263 -0.06414 
et-1 -0.06003 -0.03809 -0.01751 -0.01307 -0.01202 
      
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.679344 0.673476 0.621438 0.595509 0.578165 
Log-Likelihood 14216.02 14170.84 13802.48 13637.45 13532.87 
ARCH-LM (5) 450.1174 635.8378 652.5502 582.3663 576.0552 
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Table A.5. Heating Oil Results (continued) 
Heating Oil ARCH(1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.968771 1.043666 1.114125 1.180833 1.228445 
 
(0.003219) (0.004115) (0.005676) (0.007042) (0.007419) 
ΔFt-1 0.316373 0.264492 0.192864 0.190994 0.240539 
ΔFt-2 0.109378 0.031033 -0.02445 -0.02676 -0.01041 
ΔSt-1 -0.31553 -0.24654 -0.14389 -0.10838 -0.13356 
ΔSt-2 -0.12722 -0.06713 -0.00963 -0.00091 -0.01291 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.996416 0.937363 0.803251 0.677655 0.701225 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.651171 0.652461 0.607576 0.584348 0.564047 
Log-Likelihood 15186.84 14942.87 14523.6 14252.59 14153.44 
ARCH-LM (5) 4.131121 8.288079 26.84185 38.88366 80.91962 
      Heating Oil GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.958475 1.01029 1.060608 1.108703 1.146875 
 
(0.004404) (0.005176) (0.005901) (0.007449) (0.008011) 
ΔFt-1 0.09416 -0.00334 -0.03617 -0.02612 0.005286 
ΔFt-2 0.068184 0.012919 0.020108 0.038522 0.019658 
ΔSt-1 -0.09314 0.001912 0.038214 0.047186 0.041396 
ΔSt-2 -0.08471 -0.04173 -0.0427 -0.05608 -0.04422 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.217681 0.171582 0.153799 0.115267 0.148638 
GARCH 0.826054 0.851395 0.858844 0.894742 0.865586 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.668292 0.666145 0.61476 0.588161 0.570994 
Log-Likelihood 16044.63 15845.33 15295.56 14949.54 14849.4 
ARCH-LM (5) 0.55478 1.316538 3.246122 5.527034 5.602462 
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Table A.5. Heating Oil Results (continued) 
Heating Oil ECM-GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.962405 1.012738 1.060739 1.108443 1.147432 
 
(0.004307) (0.005048) (0.00585) (0.007392) (0.007938) 
ΔFt-1 0.070294 -0.012901 -0.039858 -0.028156 0.002902 
ΔFt-2 0.047045 0.002755 0.014583 0.030975 0.015117 
ΔSt-1 -0.06881 0.013105 0.042408 0.051518 0.04534 
ΔSt-2 -0.06286 -0.02945 -0.0364 -0.04847 -0.0381 
et-1 -0.0427 -0.02845 -0.01359 -0.01217 -0.01167 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.227266 0.171427 0.153439 0.116894 0.14831 
GARCH 0.820485 0.851966 0.8604 0.893499 0.865901 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.675577 0.671375 0.617693 0.590831 0.573618 
Log-Likelihood 16101.92 15875.79 15308.83 14968.56 14868.35 
ARCH-LM (5) 0.633434 1.31117 3.49736 6.11643 6.010633 
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Table A.6. Gasoil Results 
Gasoil Covariance 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
Hedge Ratio 0.904697 1.011695 1.046672 1.073399 1.083539 
R-Squared  0.309473 0.349796 0.331221 0.318181 0.309417 
      Gasoil OLS 
  1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 11-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.665874 0.789358 0.856935 0.89733 0.905623 
 
(0.0146) (0.015907) (0.018249) (0.019899) (0.02067) 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.294405 0.33065 0.306679 0.289712 0.278001 
Log-Likelihood 12254.48 12385.89 12298.21 12237.96 12197.2 
ARCH-LM (5) 576.0084 600.7937 595.242 588.9194 589.8425 
      Gasoil ECM 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 11-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.767919 0.894715 0.952069 0.981485 0.984522 
 
(0.014907) (0.01628) (0.018735) (0.020416) (0.021219) 
ΔFt-1 0.129876 0.163981 0.165273 0.162322 0.165411 
ΔFt-2 0.065462 0.096638 0.10927 0.112723 0.111785 
ΔFt-3 -0.0066 -0.007547 - - - 
ΔFt-4 0.020778 -0.004594 - - - 
ΔSt-1 -0.21551 -0.236631 -0.213062 -0.187584 -0.17466 
ΔSt-2 -0.09719 -0.107207 -0.100929 -0.090108 -0.08603 
ΔSt-3 0.012338 0.002216 - - - 
ΔSt-4 0.018723 0.022721 - - - 
et-1 -0.0739 -0.046295 -0.022908 -0.01611 -0.014 
      
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.354147 0.383947 0.346867 0.321438 0.305996 
Log-Likelihood 12467.82 12585.45 12443.89 12348.74 12292.69 
ARCH-LM (5) 563.0907 583.9525 588.6254 583.7984 583.5718 
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Table A.6. Gasoil Results (continued) 
Gasoil ARCH(1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 11-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.792512 0.943777 0.998653 1.021337 1.021661 
 
(0.010636) (0.011156) (0.012665) (0.013746) (0.014983) 
ΔFt-1 0.244467 0.3211 0.308588 0.294083 0.278555 
ΔFt-2 0.110025 0.134448 0.1266 0.11201 0.107318 
ΔSt-1 -0.32365 -0.385558 -0.331967 -0.273392 -0.24452 
ΔSt-2 -0.1379 -0.154478 -0.125729 -0.098111 -0.08916 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.322719 0.409265 0.387695 0.3513 0.326509 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.335417 0.36586 0.334187 0.312256 0.298552 
Log-Likelihood 12717.49 12913.18 12759.8 12637.76 12568.39 
ARCH-LM (5) 70.82962 69.15171 106.3193 105.6653 99.48533 
            Gasoil GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 11-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.793726 0.897573 0.93427 0.958125 0.957628 
 
(0.012006) (0.011855) (0.013074) (0.014647) (0.015371) 
ΔFt-1 0.246236 0.285332 0.265256 0.24901 0.246423 
ΔFt-2 0.100303 0.111489 0.102455 0.102126 0.102951 
ΔSt-1 -0.3227 -0.344773 -0.296776 -0.255145 -0.23509 
ΔSt-2 -0.1527 -0.153151 -0.127724 -0.112538 -0.10681 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.076969 0.088193 0.088405 0.088113 0.085348 
GARCH 0.921816 0.910998 0.910247 0.910531 0.913159 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.335859 0.370445 0.337284 0.313894 0.299226 
Log-Likelihood 13182.77 13364.62 13205.9 13096.57 13025.18 
ARCH-LM (5) 14.60327 18.66705 16.24063 17.09515 19.66765 
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Table A.6. Gasoil Results (continued) 
Gasoil ECM-GARCH(1,1) 
 
1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 11-Month 
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔFt (Hedge Ratio) 0.806167 0.904239 0.9373 0.961119 0.960493 
 
(0.012145) (0.01174) (0.013013) (0.014624) (0.015332) 
ΔFt-1 0.213462 0.265737 0.257787 0.245573 0.243631 
ΔFt-2 0.085161 0.104441 0.100691 0.102238 0.103559 
ΔSt-1 -0.28062 -0.317569 -0.2852 -0.247612 -0.22835 
ΔSt-2 -0.12587 -0.136308 -0.120224 -0.107619 -0.10233 
et-1 -0.06817 -0.046435 -0.01999 -0.013626 -0.01238 
      C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH 0.077702 0.09032 0.089886 0.089633 0.086704 
GARCH 0.921414 0.909278 0.908959 0.909099 0.911895 
      Adjusted R-
Squared 0.350236 0.379485 0.342621 0.317988 0.302969 
Log-Likelihood 13228.48 13396.64 13220.23 13107.76 13036.01 
ARCH-LM (5) 15.26556 19.80802 16.94522 17.30927 19.72193 
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Table A.7. 95% VaR Numeric Results  
  
Commodity 
  
WTI Brent Heating Oil Gasoil 
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
F
u
el
 u
se
 H
ed
ge
d
 
0% 
 
$(300,789.40) 
 
$(300,789.40) 
 
$(300,768.30) 
 
$(300,789.40) 
10% 
 
$(277,893.20) 
 
$(272,805.90) 
 
$(259,891.50) 
 
$(290,807.60) 
20% 
 
$(261,387.00) 
 
$(248,685.60) 
 
$(220,116.50) 
 
$(280,911.80) 
30% 
 
$(243,160.10) 
 
$(225,682.00) 
 
$(186,171.60) 
 
$(270,783.20) 
40% 
 
$(231,046.50) 
 
$(208,084.70) 
 
$(160,577.40) 
 
$(261,921.40) 
50% 
 
$(225,009.80) 
 
$(192,881.20) 
 
$(149,137.00) 
 
$(254,405.50) 
60% 
 
$(221,380.80) 
 
$(188,356.00) 
 
$(159,878.50) 
 
$(247,616.50) 
70% 
 
$(221,428.30) 
 
$(187,056.50) 
 
$(189,279.70) 
 
$(244,174.00) 
80% 
 
$(225,861.30) 
 
$(189,302.90) 
 
$(231,450.50) 
 
$(241,604.50) 
90% 
 
$(234,228.50) 
 
$(199,415.70) 
 
$(279,605.10) 
 
$(240,175.60) 
100% 
 
$(245,130.40) 
 
$(214,362.40) 
 
$(329,847.90) 
 
$(238,556.60) 
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Figure A.1. 99% VaR Results Graph 
 
Table A.8. 99% VaR Numeric Results 
  
Commodity 
  
WTI Brent Heating Oil Gasoil 
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
F
u
el
 u
se
 H
ed
ge
d
 
0% 
 
$(427,080.36) 
 
$(427,260.23) 
 
$(426,982.36) 
 
$(427,442.08) 
10% 
 
$(397,720.33) 
 
$(392,844.21) 
 
$(372,271.31) 
 
$(407,443.64) 
20% 
 
$(375,604.03) 
 
$(352,424.32) 
 
$(317,203.81) 
 
$(397,559.83) 
30% 
 
$(351,388.79) 
 
$(320,622.61) 
 
$(271,941.74) 
 
$(381,070.02) 
40% 
 
$(331,502.47) 
 
$(297,651.84) 
 
$(230,898.93) 
 
$(365,439.72) 
50% 
 
$(317,963.12) 
 
$(277,504.35) 
 
$(212,111.16) 
 
$(356,439.27) 
60% 
 
$(318,647.77) 
 
$(268,294.20) 
 
$(230,971.78) 
 
$(350,956.49) 
70% 
 
$(316,604.47) 
 
$(260,700.25) 
 
$(269,822.69) 
 
$(345,879.28) 
80% 
 
$(323,423.38) 
 
$(264,450.75) 
 
$(335,358.31) 
 
$(341,420.39) 
90% 
 
$(343,769.87) 
 
$(289,452.77) 
 
$(401,116.11) 
 
$(336,840.06) 
100% 
 
$(368,734.88) 
 
$(313,614.90) 
 
$(468,336.08) 
 
$(335,591.02) 
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